WSANZ conference 2016 keynotes, and panel and paper abstracts

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NGAHUIA TE AWEKOTUKU – Opening keynote

He puna roimata, he maimai aroha. We remember and honour those that worked for a better, safer world for our daughters.

This presentation is about remembering.

Mai muri, ki mua: from our past, to our future, we know that to understand today and to anticipate tomorrow, we must remember yesterday and those early years of struggle. So let’s revisit the heady days of Auckland in 1970, 1971, 1972.

They were times of infectious energy and excitement, floating on a robust economy, expressing our rage at the Vietnam War, apartheid South Africa – “No Māoris – No Tour” (sic) – and the concurrent emergence of Ngā Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panthers.

Women’s liberation ignited in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin in the same few months from the early spring of 1970 and summer of 1971. We were inspired by various books, like Notes from the second year, Betty Friedan, and Robin Morgan. Two gatherings occurred in Auckland – the community-based Women for Equality, and the university group. The very first small meeting in September 1970 collapsed when brutish engineering students turned up for a laugh. They clarified what the problem was. We began to consciously position ourselves with reference to the patriarchy; to the hegemony of male power. One of the first well-planned and well-attended events was a public seminar on Women and … (the dotted lines could be any topic; namely, politics, crime, psychology, the Vietnam War, health, education, industry); the speakers included Merimeri Penfold (Māori), Connie Purdue (equal pay), and Nadya Tollemarche (law); it was low key, but it reached people.

It was also a nascent moment in the development of women’s studies, a pathway through which we defined and articulated, researched and investigated our own knowledge with women at the centre, not the periphery.

We were working for a better world for all women; for the right to choose. This meant getting attention, ensuring the media focus on those issues of significance. There were so many issues – equal pay for equal work, free safe contraception, abortion rights, equal access to education, free childcare. We demanded action. Changes, choices, chances.

We staged various public happenings. In one flamboyant action reported internationally, we occupied the lounge bar at the Great Northern Hotel. We made the front page of the Herald, Susan Kedgley and I smiling into our cocktails and proclaiming that such male-only spaces needed to be ‘liberated.’

Another was Suffrage Day in Albert Park, 1971, with a special awards ceremony and a mock funeral for Victorian values beneath the monument to Queen Victoria herself. An effective demonstration.

Has anyone attempted to examine, probe, and deconstruct these moments in our herstory? Or is it still considered too recent?

One fiercely held belief was ‘the personal was political.’ In July 1971, I published Lesbianism: The elegance of unfettered love in the university newspaper. I asked, ‘Why should we be invisible?’ This prompted a senior female academic to reprimand me for being irresponsible, indiscrete, and promoting an unhealthy lifestyle to vulnerable young women. She was involved with a woman at the time.

The movement continued to flourish, and many embraced the slogan, ‘our bodies, our selves’ and the basic human right to good health. It is in this vital area that many of the most profound
changes have been achieved; we can claim some control over our reproductive capacity as females in 2016, but we remain at risk.

By the mid-1970s, rifts were forming. Returning again to the notion that the personal is political, another popular assertion was this – ‘feminism is the theory: lesbianism is the action.’ We had a lot of fun! A select few of us, ‘like that’ before the movement, behaved with missionary enthusiasm, while ‘camp’ drinking mates looked on in jealous horror. Women’s libbers were peculiar; it was in this context that awareness of class, for many women, came to light. Some, disillusioned with the direction of straight feminism, and the growing awareness of heterosexual privilege, decided to work more closely with gay brothers as Gay Liberation began in 1972.

Predictably, sadly, men’s business prevailed, and disenchanted lesbians founded the successful Gay Feminist Collective.

Others eventually proclaimed a ferocious radicalism that published and agitated extensively, made music, made art, made community. We called ourselves Lesbian Nation. And we were particularly visible at the United Women’s Conventions that began here in 1973 and embraced a massive range of women’s organisations. Another significant triumph was the founding, and endurance over many decades, of Broadsheet Magazine; ngā mihi nui.

However, Aotearoa/New Zealand is a small, isolated cluster of South Pacific islands – we are not America or Europe, we have the total population of a small London borough – but we achieved women’s suffrage first.

And 120 years later, in April 2013, further historic legislation ensured that women (and men) can marry each other.

Does that make the world a safer, better, place for women?

Domestic and sexual violence, and the violence of war, persist. Public awareness, and horror, have increased. By how much? Such changes take decades, even generations; as the more entrenched patriarchal values, and male entitlement, are challenged and discarded. Many effective groups and interventions have evolved, several from very modest beginnings; this is what many regard as the frontline of the feminist struggle. Showing men how to respect women. Kia kaha tātou.

Much of what we did, over these decades, was also strengthened by sister outsiders – women of substance and wisdom, women from a diversity of ethnic backgrounds, sexualities, creative work, and academic disciplines, who visited and talked with us. These encounters and conversations enrich our feminism, extend our scholarship, and keep us all honest.

Another strategy is creative expression – the visual and performing arts, and the production of feminist or women’s culture. This was a contentious issue in its day, but what remains, and inspires, are moments like these, and the glorious work of so many talented and astonishing women who continue to confront the patriarchate.

As we consider today’s reality, we come to the intersectionalities that occur upon this constructed landscape, the re/generation of the feminist project. What is happening now.

Māori women, Pacific women, Asian women, mixed heritage women, what does it mean for those at these intersections by chance or birth or choice?

And specifically, for my own, for Māori women? Mana wāhine? I no longer worry about whether or not there is a Māori presence at gatherings like this. I eventually realised that my sisters and cousins weren’t here because they didn’t want to be. They had different priorities.

I finally get it, and I lament all those wasted hours; the talking back, the talking up, the talking with my own, and with my Pākehā feminist colleagues and friends.

As Māori women, we have our own place; as he mana wāhine, he mana a whenua, we are this land. For years I didn’t hear what the women in my whānau, my iwi, and my bed were
telling me; but I do now. It’s choices, chances, chances again; and Māori choose not to come.

We have always had our own heroines; we have always made our own way. And with so many entangled issues – te reo rangatira, land rights, racism, poverty, family violence, literacy, better health, cultural resilience – weaving our own futures remains a challenge.

So the decades have passed … but the issues have not. Some successful interventions have occurred, and some are being addressed, not yet resolved. And we know that there is so much more to be done.

How far have we come, from the probing commentary of Cherry Raymond to the wise ladies on *Beauty and the beast*, or Ella Henry’s vivacious *Ask your aunties*, and this most recent diversion – described by one critic as privileged excess and offensive stupidity – *The real housewives of Auckland*?

So I conclude with a couple of observations.

That Women’s Liberation, and institutionalised Women’s Studies, were hijacked by the neoliberal convulsions of the material 1980s, and collectivity and community were waylaid by the primacy of the ‘individual’, of the ‘self’, and introspective ‘me-focused’ indulgence.

That feminism, whatever the contemporary sociocultural or geographic context, is still a constantly evolving work in progress.

And I leave you with this recent ALAC poster of two Māori women dancing. It proclaims that nearly 50 years later, we are no longer invisible.

*Kia ora koutou.*

### 2. Feminist futures in the Anthropocene: Sustainable citizenship and the challenges of climate change and social justice

**PRIYA KURIAN – Closing keynote**

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The ‘Anthropocene’, a term proliferating across multiple disciplines, is increasingly being used to describe our current epoch, when humans have themselves become a geological force transforming the planet in fundamental ways. Coined by biologist Eugene Stoermer in the early 1980s, and then popularised by Nobel Prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen in 2000 (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000), the Anthropocene refers to the emergence of a time when human actions, shaped by a complex mix of technological capacity, political and material contexts, and values of domination, have resulted in the destruction of nature on an unprecedented scale.

What marks this moment of naming a new epoch – a boundary-setting moment – whether we call it the ‘Anthropocene, the Plantationocene, or the Capitalocene’ is the ‘scale, rate/speed, synchronicity, and complexity’ of the changes we witness (Haraway, 2015, p. 159). Although the term seems to carry the undertones of human triumphalism, perhaps it is better seen as a *confession* – a recognition that humans have created the prospect for a systems failure of the planet, which includes in its sweep the simultaneous catastrophes we face today, including climate change, a sky-rocketing rate of species extinction, freshwater degradation and depletion, soil erosion, resource extraction/mining, industrialised monoculture agriculture, and a deluge of toxic chemicals bringing with it the poisoning of human and non-human species (see, e.g., Nicholson & Wapner, 2015).

The starting point for the new epoch offered by scholars can vary significantly, but what is evident is the pivotal role played by capitalism in the destruction of nature. Yet capitalism alone cannot be held responsible for the Anthropocene. Intertwined through the logic of capitalism
are the politics of colonisation and colonialism and the continued presence of Empire in shaping current political realities (Munshi & Kurian, 2009). Together, capitalism and neo-colonialism have proved to be potent forces for the destruction and exploitation of the multispecies world we inhabit.

This idea of the Anthropocene forces us to rethink the world of nature and culture as we know it, creating new landscapes of activism and alliances that go beyond resilience to regeneration. To meet the challenges of a world marked by intensifying climate change, growing social injustice, and political upheaval calls for renewed forms of feminist responses embodied in some notion of ‘sustainable citizenship’ (Kurian, Munshi, & Bartlett, 2014). Enacting sustainable citizenship in the Anthropocene, in other words, needs a vision of feminist futures. This brief paper outlines one such vision through an exploration of the intersecting narratives of climate justice and sustainable citizenship.

Climate change, in many ways, embodies the Anthropocene. It is undoubtedly the most severe crisis facing us – threatening the survival of not just humans but multiple species and habitats. It is the ‘wicked’ problem of our time, a term that signifies a problem that is rendered so complex because of the intertwined social, political, economic, and technical aspects that it rarely has a simple solution. The consequences of climate change are so overwhelmingly dire that it calls for a fundamental questioning of our politics, economics, culture, and social institutions. And yet, when we look at our elites and, indeed, significant sections of the public, whether in Aotearoa/New Zealand or elsewhere in the Anglosphere, there is an extraordinary and stubborn refusal to act. It is, as Amitav Ghosh (2016) most recently described it, a time of ‘great derangement.’

If climate change is literally transforming our geo-physical landscape, then it is also simultaneously changing the political landscape in ways that are both anti-democratic and apolitical and impacting the social landscape by exacerbating social injustice. The issue of ‘climate justice’ arises from two sources: First is the limited ability of poorer nations to respond to the humanitarian and environmental crises triggered by climate change, whether in terms of adapting to the new realities or in the resources available to respond to extreme weather events that are becoming the new normal; second is the fundamental ethical and moral issue of our time – those who have done the least to cause climate change, such as the marginalised peoples of the third world, are those who face the worst consequences, while those who carry the historical responsibility for the climate crisis walk away from it, safe in their knowledge that they have the wealth, often stripped from former colonies, to buffer themselves from the worst impacts of climate change.

From a feminist perspective, it is worth noting that the dominant discourses around both the Anthropocene and climate change are often troubling. By focusing on the ‘Anthropos’ – humans – the Anthropocene literally ignores all other species, privileging humans in ways that seem both simplistic and apolitical. As Haraway (2016) points out, ‘the contemporary world is not a human species act’ but created through a complex, inter-connected, and inter-related mesh of situated people, their technologies, and all living things (as cited in Haraway et al., 2016, p. 539). Second, it has global pretensions. The Earth, as we know, ‘is not a unified space’ (Gilbert, 2016, as cited in Haraway et al., 2016, p. 540). The differences in power, wealth, and access to and impact on resources, among many other things, are a significant feminist concern. Indeed, the undifferentiated ‘human’ of the Anthropos reproduces and re-inscribes the privileges of White heterosexual males of the North in the face of feminist intersectional analysis, which demonstrates the centrality of race, class, sexuality, nationality, and other structural realities in shaping how we experience the impacts of the Anthropocene. Raworth (2014) suggested that a better term may well be the ‘Manthropocene.’ A third concern is that, just as with climate
change, the idea of the Anthropocene gives rise to what are called the ‘good Anthropocene people’, the ‘fix-it people’ (Tsing, 2016, as cited in Haraway et al., 2016, p. 546), who believe in techno-fxes and proffer markets and capitalism as a means to magic our way out of the mess we are in.

There is, overall, a masculinisation of environmental discourses with men’s voices dominating the science, government, and business realms of climate politics (MacGregor, 2014, p. 623). The dominance of elite technocratic discourses serves to marginalise the voices of women, indigenous communities, and the marginalised in decision-making processes. Also pushed off the agenda are a range of pressing issues, including toxic wastes and polluting chemicals, access to and control over water and forests, genetic engineering, and so on, where women and local communities have often taken the lead in challenging corporate and state interests. In addition, the climate crisis has translated into exhortations to individuals to bring about lifestyle changes to do their bit for the climate. Websites and newsletters from government agencies, environmental organisations, and others give us tips about consuming better, driving less, switching lightbulbs, and eating less or no meat – all very important in their own ways – but that tell us almost nothing about collaborative political action. Many of the actions involve environmental actions in the home, a feminised space, with implications for women’s responsibilities. We need to recognise that by framing actions on climate change predominantly through an individualistically moral lens, it homogenises the issue to allow for only ‘one right way’, thereby shutting down vital debates and the possibilities for diverse forms of action and thought.

A new kind of politics

Despite the controversy around the meanings and implications of the discourses of the Anthropocene and climate change, it is clear that the idea of the Anthropocene calls for a new kind of politics if we want to transform the world in which we live. Like it or not, it underpins and shapes new landscapes and new terrains that seep into our activism and work. If we want to craft new conversations, new forms of art, and music, and being, then we must rethink the world of nature and culture as we know it. What then can we do to create new, alternative landscapes of activism and alliances that go beyond resilience to regeneration? How do we craft feminist futures in the Anthropocene? I suggest we can do this through a feminist envisioning of citizenship – i.e. sustainable citizenship. Sustainable citizenship, ‘a contingent and fluid conception of citizenship with deliberative dialectics at its core’, seeks to embody Fraser’s (2007, p. 8) vision of integrating ‘normative standards and emancipatory political possibilities’ through a holistic view of environmental, social, economic, and cultural sustainability shaped by democratic politics (Kurian, Munshi, & Bartlett, 2014, p. 447).

At its heart, sustainable citizenship is an active citizenship that offers a model of a new form of politics. It is a politics that recognises the centrality of power, recognising that there are no innocent relationships between and amongst humans and other species who co-exist in the Anthropocene. It is a citizenship that recognises the centrality of a radical democratic politics that is enacted in the local struggles that take place within national contexts, while working through collaborative action to link to transnational agendas of sustainability. There are, for example, numerous movements that have built strategic alliances to tackle, for example, large-scale dam building and destructive resource extraction and expropriation by corporations and nation states, and, more recently, to mobilise around climate justice to keep fossil fuels in the ground and spark a just transition to alternative energy systems everywhere. (The most recent and powerful example of feminist mobilizing is of course the Women’s Global March
in January 2017 – an extraordinary demonstration of global solidarity against the misogyny, racism, and violence embodied by the Trump administration.) Unifying global discourses of 'sustainable development' and ‘planet Earth’ can thus be juxtaposed against the presence of movements grounded in local realities, cultures, and practices. And everywhere we look, women have been on the frontlines of such local actions.

Feminist futures in the Anthropocene can come about through our diverse forms of enactment of sustainable citizenship. Such enactments offer potential pathways to a sustainable society in the context of the Anthropocene and are inspired by the struggles and resistances of individuals and communities around the world. As we argued in Feminist futures: Reimagining women, culture and development (Bhavnani, Foran, Kurian, & Munshi, 2016),

Such resistance is inherently cultural, because the economy, social relations and ideologies are all expressed through cultures. And indeed, culture (in Raymond Williams’s sense of structures of feeling) is the focal point of a vision for feminist futures. It is through culture that it becomes possible to imagine new ways of living and being. The feminisms we theorize are built upon cultures: cultures of political economy, a sophisticated understanding of patriarchal relationships, and a profound recognition of how ‘race’/ethnicity, religion and nationality interact with other configurations of inequality. (pp. xxii-xxiii)

Envisioning feminist futures through sustainable citizenship requires us to come together through culture to create new stories, new narratives, and new pedagogical practices that engage with the realities of the Anthropocene to ensure a just and sustainable world for current and future generations. Now more than ever, we know that if we want social justice and ecojustice for this planet, then we need to say with Margot Roth: ‘Roll on the revolution!’

References


Gender and class in Aotearoa/New Zealand work/care regimes

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Work/care regimes are the systems and regulations, both formal and informal, at both organisational and institutional levels, that govern how we perceive, operationalise, and value care as work – both marketised care and care within the family (Ravenswood & Harris, 2016; Ravenswood & Kaine, 2015; Ravenswood & Markey, 2017). In other words, work/care regimes are the hegemonic gendered class practices that value paid work over care work and enforce gender inequality. These are the norms that underlie the decisions made by government, by leaders, by family, and by colleagues.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand (and other countries), both paid and unpaid care work is highly gendered: Approximately 90% of care workers in aged care are women, and – according to Census data – more women than men engage in unpaid care work for neighbours, friends, and people outside their household (Ravenswood & Smith, 2017). However, the question of class in relation to gender has received less attention in recent years (Ravenswood & Harris, 2016).

Some common ways we delineate class are through education, occupation, and profession, with middle class associated with qualifications, managerial/authority positions, better work conditions, and of course better money. Conversely, working class is associated with lower class and lower money (Acker, 2006; Hughes, 2004; West & Fenstermaker, 1995). Care work is historically undervalued because of its association with the domestic sphere and unpaid work (Folbre & Nelson, 2000). Care work, therefore, is also classed because it has been deemed (through gender discrimination) to fall outside of capitalist reckonings of waged production (Berry & Bell, 2012; Weigt & Solomon, 2008). Care/work regimes are a complex interplay of hegemonic class and gender norms imposed on the social and economic value of care work carried out within families and in the market. The results of this are seen in the data above: that women carry out most of the care work in New Zealand and that it is either unpaid or low paid work, often invisible to society.

In recent years, three separate legal actions have been taken by carers and their representatives that challenge these gendered and classed norms of care work: (a) legal action taken by family carers asserting discrimination based on family status; (b) averted legal action taken by home and community care workers under the Minimum Wage Act 1983; and (c) legal action taken by a residential aged care worker, Kristine Bartlett, under the Equal Pay Act 1972. All three of these have resulted in success and increased pay for these groups of workers.

However, this paper argues that the degree of success of each action was dependent on the extent to which they challenged the gendered, classed work/care regime. Family carers’ action challenged the concept of family and unpaid care work at its core, focusing on care that is not marketised and is for family members. While the challenge was successful, the government’s response has been criticised for placing so many restrictions on eligibility that it severely limits who, as a family carer, can apply for payment. It also prevented further legal action being taken on the same grounds – a punitive response for transgressing accepted gender and class norms. The legal action of community care workers was diverted to tripartite negotiations that resulted in regulatory change so that workers would be paid for travel time between clients and has resulted in ongoing negotiations to improve work conditions in the sector. This action did not per se challenge gender and class norms but used the concept of basic work rights of the minimum wage. Kristine Bartlett’s legal action is nearing conclusion and may result in record
pay rates. However, again, it challenged fundamental gender and class norms of care work and resulted in protracted legal actions and negotiations with the government. At the time of writing, the unprecedented government funding was announced, followed by the release of a Bill that could make similar action impossible – again a punitive government response. In conclusion, where action is taken that transgresses deep-seated gendered class norms of work/care regimes (such as family carers and paid parental leave), regulatory responses are reluctant and restricted, yet where the challenge is to minima employment rights (such as minimum wage entitlements for in-between travel time), regulatory responses are more receptive and positive, thus illustrating the way in which gendered and class norms of work/care regimes operate at a government and regulatory level to reproduce gender inequality.

References


Women of LiLACS NZ

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Population ageing brings to the fore societal challenges in supporting independence (Lloyd-Sherlock et al., 2012). The oldest old age group, those aged 85 years and over, will grow the fastest of all, tripling in size over the next 25 years (Department of Statistics, 2017). There is a longevity disparity of seven to eight years between Māori and non-Māori New Zealanders that has not reduced in recent years (Ministry of Health, 2011).

Although around the world women live longer, on average, than men (the gender disparity in New Zealand is lessening and is now only around four years (Department of Statistics, 2017)), women are particularly vulnerable to higher rates of disability in old age (Wu et al., 2012). They also live longer with disability than men do. The cohort study, *Te puāwaitanga o ngā tapuwae kia ora tonu/Life and living in advanced age* (LiLACS NZ) (Kerse et al., 2015) provides an opportunity to outline the social and economic situation for New Zealand women of advanced age.
Methods

In 2010, LiLACS NZ recruited and enrolled two population-based cohorts from the Bay of Plenty and Lakes regions, with a first wave of data collection from 421 Māori aged 80–90 and 516 non-Māori aged 85 years (Dyall et al., 2013; Kerse et al., 2016b).

Written informed consent was given by participants and/or their family and whānau for either a brief or full questionnaire covering health, wellbeing, living circumstances, and other matters, a physical assessment, and linking with administrative data. (Hayman et al., 2012). Interviews were repeated yearly until either the participant died or five years of follow-up were completed (Kerse et al., 2015). Health-related quality of life was assessed at each interview using a short health survey, SF-12 (Brazier & Roberts, 2004).

LiLACS NZ also interviewed carers of participants (kaiāwhina) after 24 months and 36 months of follow-up. Carers were asked about the experience of caring, the amount of care, and their views of the positives and negatives of caring using the COPE scale (Roud, Keeling, & Sainsbury, 2006).

This presentation focuses on the women of LiLACS NZ, outlining their health, socio-economic status, and living arrangements and how these changed over time.

Results

Figure 1 shows that women were more likely to live alone than men, with 63% of non-Māori and 51% of Māori women living alone. Other data from LiLACS NZ showed that Māori women were more likely to live in areas of high deprivation (60% compared with 32%) and, although most owned their own home, Māori women were more likely than non-Māori women to be tenants. Women (46% of Māori women and 32% of non-Māori women) were more likely to have the New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) as their only source of income compared with...
men (Kerse & LiLACS NZ, 2015a; Kerse et al., 2015).

Māori women were engaged in their culture, with 50% being able to hold an everyday conversation in te reo Māori and almost all using te reo in a range of settings (Dyall et al., 2014; Hayman et al., 2012; Kerse & LiLACS NZ, 2015b; Kerse et al., 2015). Māori women had, on average, 16 mokopuna/grandchildren, and 62% had four to six surviving children (Dyall et al., 2014). In contrast, non-Māori women had, on average, seven grandchildren, and 32% had four to six surviving children (Kerse et al., 2016b). Almost all women contributed to their grandchildren in some way, with Māori women being more likely to make practical contributions such as childcare and financial support.

The health and wellbeing of the LiLACS NZ women was, on the whole, good. Multimorbidity was ubiquitous, with 93% of LiLACS NZ participants having two or more health conditions (Teh et al., 2014). Despite this, over 70% of Māori and non-Māori women, more so than men, were able to look after themselves and their house, get about outside, and manage their medications without assistance.

Māori and non-Māori women both gave and received care. They were more likely than their male counterparts to receive support services (because they were more likely than men to live alone) and just as likely as men to support others regularly (in spite of the fact that fewer women than men had spouses still living) (Kerse et al., 2016a).

By five years’ follow up (non-Māori aged 90 years, Māori aged 85–95 years) 70% of Māori women and 80% of non-Māori women were widowed; 50% of Māori women lived alone and 70% of non-Māori women lived alone. Health-related quality of life was indistinguishable between Māori and non-Māori and between men and women.

Two-thirds of participants had a nominated carer who agreed to be interviewed. Women predominated as carers, and most informal carers lived close by the participant, with 40% living on the same property (Kerse et al., 2016a). Carers gave up to 30 hours of care weekly to participants and generally felt more positive than negative about the care they gave (Kerse et al., 2016a).

Discussion

Women in their eighties are much more likely to live alone than men and, on average, have a lower socioeconomic position, putting them at risk of less positive outcomes. However, they appear to be managing well, as they are, on the whole, living independently and have as good a quality of life as men in the same age group.

References


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Feminist knowledge and legal discourse have a problematic relationship. To state the contrast at its most basic, feminist knowledge is grounded in women’s experience, while legal discourse is arguably grounded in men’s experience and knowledge of the world. The two have fundamentally different epistemologies, with feminist knowledge being derived from the collective consciousness of women’s oppression, whereas legal discourse claims to be a rational, objective, disembodied ‘view from nowhere’ that develops by means of inductive and deductive logic. Most importantly, feminist knowledge is subjugated knowledge, whereas legal discourse is enormously powerful.

Many fraught encounters between feminist knowledge and legal discourse have been played out in attempts by feminists to reform the law. First-wave feminists identified law as a key part of the problem for women. Since women’s oppression was widely effected through law, it was necessary to change the law to relieve that oppression. However, despite the removal of women’s formal legal disabilities, such as the inability to hold property, make contracts, vote, and engage in professional occupations, second-wave feminists faced the continuing social subordination of women. Again, they sought to harness the power of law to combat issues such as sex discrimination, sexual harassment, unequal pay, domestic violence, lack of reproductive autonomy, poverty following relationship breakdown, and the criminal law’s appalling treatment of rape complainants and battered women who killed abusive partners. But these strategies
turned out to have only limited success. Despite legal reforms, all of the problems they were supposed to address have persisted. And worse, women bringing legal claims often found themselves unable to fit their experience into the legal categories and hence lost their cases.

The question of what went wrong has subsequently received much legal feminist attention. For example, Mary Jane Mossman (1986) argued that legal method is structured in such a way as to be impervious to a feminist perspective and constitutes a major obstacle to feminist interventions in law. Carol Smart (1989) observed that legal discourse is both powerful and productive of its subjects, and that part of its power lies in its disqualification of other knowledges, including feminist knowledge. Thus, law’s account of women, which derives from and feeds into wider oppressive social discourses about women, trumps and erases feminist accounts of women. Therefore, she argued, feminists need to contest legal discourse but should not imagine it can ever serve our interests. In my book on the implementation of feminist law reforms on domestic violence (Hunter, 2008), I contended that the failures of feminist law reform are due to a combination of legal structures – the ways in which legal categories continue to fail to map onto the reality of women’s lives – and legal culture – the taken-for-granted assumptions of the still overwhelmingly male personnel who administer and implement the law. These arguments all suggest that we cannot continue unproblematically engaging in law reform efforts, but they differ in how much space they see for possible change. Is legal discourse really a closed system into which feminist knowledge can never permeate? Or is it actually more contingent, open-textured, and essentially political, as other left-progressive critics have maintained? Can changing the personnel of law change the nature of legal discourse?

Exploring these questions has meant switching attention from legislation to judging, first through feminist judgment projects and second through studies of (real) feminist judges. The feminist judgment projects have involved feminist academics and lawyers rewriting existing judgments from a feminist perspective, asking how a feminist judge might have decided the case, at the same time as and subject to the same constraints as the original judges. Projects in Canada, the UK, Australia, Northern/Ireland, and the United States, in international law, and in Aotearoa/New Zealand have produced legally plausible alternative judgments, powerfully demonstrating that the original cases could have been decided differently. This suggests that legal method is not impervious to a feminist perspective and that feminist knowledge can be articulated as part of legal discourse. However, these projects do not necessarily solve the problem of legal culture. Indeed, part of their premise is to create a different cultural context from which the production of feminist judgments becomes possible.

Nevertheless, real-world examples of feminist judging are also beginning to emerge. High-profile feminist judges have included Justice Gaudron on the Australian High Court, Justice Ginsburg on the U.S. Supreme Court, Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé on the Canadian Supreme Court, and Lady Hale on the UK Supreme Court. Many others are now working in the trenches in lower and intermediate trial courts, on tribunals and appeals courts. Thinking about lower courts reminds us that feminist judging may include creating an inclusive space in the courtroom and deciding on contested facts by believing women’s stories and assessing credibility from a feminist perspective. My case studies of feminist judges (Hunter, 2013; Hunter & Tyson, 2017) have also shown them intervening in legal discourse by incorporating feminist knowledge and positively implementing feminist legislative reforms. These studies also address the issue of the conditions necessary for ‘outsider’ judges to overcome the constraints of legal culture. There are certainly enough women judges – and women in other positions of power – for us to be well aware that simply being a woman does not necessarily make a difference. What appears to make a difference is a combination of two factors: the opportunity to take a feminist approach (the subject matter of the case, the degree of legal
choice or discretion available); and the will to do so (Hunter, 2015). This is often indicated by the fact that the judge has a background of feminist and/or social justice activism in their pre-judicial lives. We need more of these judges on our courts!

In summary, much of the feminist theorising around the relationship between feminist knowledge and legal discourse has been based on a presumed separation between the two. But now we can both imagine and see feminists inside law, in positions of legal authority, with power to shape legal discourse, the future of the relationship is perhaps more hopeful, and certainly will be more interesting.

References


Behind the wire: Māori women and prison

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The Māori experience of colonisation is paralleled by the struggles of indigenous peoples in other settler states, which have also been systematically brutalised and marginalised by state policies and practices contributing to the disproportionality found in prison populations (Webb, 2011). In speaking of Māori women and the prison, it is important to honour the many women who have worked and continue to work in this area. I acknowledge the work of the other panellists, Rosemary Hunter, Elisabeth McDonald, and Khylee Quince. I acknowledge Sina Brown Davis, Emilie Rakete, and other abolitionists. I acknowledge Lily George, Cherryl Smith, Rebecca Wirihana, Helena Rattray, Leonie Pihama, Rihi Te Nana, and the women they work with. I recognise that the critical task of prison abolition has been led largely by women of colour, by indigenous women, and by members of queer and trans communities.

If asked to reflect on prison and prisoners, we are likely to conjure up images that depict an entirely masculine world. Yet the experience of prison is highly gendered. The crisis of mass Māori imprisonment and the ongoing incarceration of indigenous communities has resulted in a profound un-freedom for Māori and other indigenous groups (McIntosh & Radojkovic, 2012). Prisons are seen as a natural attribute of the social landscape, and we struggle to imagine a world without them. While they remain unproblematised and largely invisible, both as institution and as experience, they are not invisible from headlines; not invisible as a metaphor of society gone wrong; not invisible as a ‘solution’ to problems; and not invisible as the most overt manifestation of state power and as architectures of control. But they are invisible as receptacles of confined experience, as institutions of stone, concrete, wire, but most importantly as holders of flesh and blood. Prisons are peopled. In Aotearoa/New Zealand,
they are largely holders of Māori flesh and blood. More specifically, they are holders of particular veins of Māori society. If it was simply a Māori issue, then we would expect to see Māori prisoners coming from all socio-economic categories and reflecting the broader Māori population. Yet the Māori prison population overwhelmingly comes from communities that live under conditions of scarcity and deprivation (McIntosh & Workman, 2017).

A focus on women in prison demands an understanding of their experience of confined lives, both within and outside the wire, and raises a number of issues that may help us further develop our critique of the prison system. Ideologies of gender and of sexuality – and particularly the intersection of ethnicity and sexuality – have had a profound effect on the representations of – and treatment received by – criminalised/marginalised women both within and outside prison. Angela Davis (2003) alerted us to the fact that while many (Black) men’s life-course experience follows a ‘perilous continuity’ in the way they are criminalised as children in schools and subject to racial profiling and then warehoused in prison, for women the pathway from the ‘free world’ to prison is even more complicated. Often the structural and real violence they experience in prison is reminiscent of the violence they have confronted in their homes and in their intimate relationships.

Women in prison tend to share a number of characteristics. They are a disadvantaged and marginalised population, and one that is disproportionately drawn from the most deprived and marginalised sections of society. They often have histories of poorer physical and mental health and issues associated with alcohol and drug misuse. Incarcerated women are also disproportionately likely to come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, be poorly educated, un- or under-employed, and recipients of state benefits (Bentley, 2014). Over the past 15 years, New Zealand has sent greater numbers of women to prison. Bentley (2014) noted that these increases occurred despite the fact that women’s offending rates have been stable and even in decline for some offences. She argued that more women are ‘going to prison for minor crimes, first time offences and breaches to community based orders that are unattainable, unrealistic and are not tailored to the gendered needs of women’ (Bentley, 2014, p. 44).

Māori women in prison are a socially submerged population. Moreover, the disproportionality of Māori in the criminal justice system is particularly pronounced for Māori women, who are even more over-represented than Māori men in apprehensions, convictions, and imprisonments. These women come out of communities where they are members of whānau, have iwi and hapū connections, and have intimate and complex ties that link them to places, histories, and people. They are likely to have experienced multiple forms of social harm and may have gone on to perpetrate social harm on others. Moreover, their experience and knowledge of incarceration usually significantly predates their own confinement (McIntosh, 2011).

Processes of decarceration that address social harm will only be sustained when there is recognition that individuals and groups who have experienced incarceration and are experts of their own condition have a vital role to play in creating the conditions for change.

As indigenous sociologists and allied researchers working within a settler state, we have an obligation to address the crisis of mass incarceration and a contribution to make in ensuring that those with institutional knowledge gained under conditions of confinement are supported in telling their stories, identifying that which needs to be changed and articulating a way forward that would reduce social harm within our communities. Part of a social harm reduction programme is ensuring that victims do not become perpetrators. A prison identity is neither an ascribed identity nor a natural identity conferred by descent. It is an identity that emerges out of structural violence and – like the structures of society – is amenable to positive change.
References


**Feminism, trans women, and the legal definition of rape: What is the current case for gender neutral drafting?**

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In 2005, the offence of rape in section 128 of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) (the Act) was specifically preserved as an exception to one of the aims of the proposed reforms, namely gender neutrality. Even though the Select Committee made the decision that ‘rape’ (of a woman by a man) should be retained as one way that sexual violation can be committed, the revised version refers not to the gender of the offender (‘person A’) but rather to their possession (and use) of a penis. Similarly, the victim (‘person B’) is not named as a woman but rather as someone who has (female) ‘genitalia’ (s 128(2)). Given that penis and genitalia are defined in section 2 of the Act so as to include a surgically constructed or reconstructed organ analogous to a naturally occurring penis [or genitalia] (whether the person concerned is male, female, or of indeterminate sex), the unhelpful and counterintuitive consequences of the current definition means:

- People with female genitalia cannot rape (this includes most trans men in New Zealand as it is rare for them to have undergone genital reconstruction surgeries – so they are therefore usually in the position of person B in the current definition (see also McDonald & Byrne, 2015).
- People without female genitalia cannot be raped (this includes most trans women in New Zealand as only a minority will have undergone genital reconstruction surgeries – so they are therefore often in the position of person A in the current definition).
- An intersex person will have their position (as able to be raped or not) defined by their genitals, not their sex. Given intersex variations are inherently about body diversity, it is also unclear when an intersex person’s genitals would be assessed as ‘analogous’ to what the legislation refers to as naturally occurring genitalia – and this requirement, regardless of their affirmed sex or gender identity – would dictate whether the definition applies to them.

Section 128 defines sexual violation as also including unlawful sexual connection, which covers all other serious penetrative sexual offending, including by use of objects. This aspect of the offence of sexual violation is entirely neutral in terms of sex, gender identity, and a person’s intersex status. Section 128 limits the term ‘rape’ to the anatomical definition described above.
(which I refer to as ‘legal rape’). In contrast to the narrow definition of ‘legal rape’, the term ‘rape’ is claimed much more broadly as a description of sexual assault in many communities, including by trans and gender-diverse people as well as in the mainstream media. Further, the Court of Appeal in R v AM [2010] 2 NZLR 750, which established guideline sentences for judges to apply in cases of sexual violation, used the term ‘rape bands’ to develop starting points for sentencing for particular types of harm. The ‘rape bands’ encompass legal rape, penile penetration of mouth or anus, or any violation involving objects. The Court also stated that the sentencing guidelines ‘are to be applied in the same way regardless of the gender of the offender or of the victim’ (at [80]), and the maximum penalty for any type of sexual violation, legal rape or otherwise, is the same. Further, anal sexual violation is often used as an intentionally degrading aspect of sexual violence, yet this is not recognised by the law as ‘rape’ so therefore not as a particular form of gendered harm.

Given the disjuncture between how rape is spoken about and conceptualised in our communities and how it is statutorily defined, it seems timely, 12 years since the Select Committee voted to retain ‘rape’, to reconsider the scope of legal rape in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Now there is increased societal recognition and acceptance that the sex people are assigned at birth does not tell the full story for everyone, it must be time to ensure that the law is inclusive and consistent for all women – those assigned female at birth and those who are not – in terms of protection from sexual violence.

The options for change, regarding the definition of rape, remain similar to those considered by the Select Committee in 2004. One would be to remove the reference to ‘rape’ altogether, meaning that sexual violation would apply to all forms of unlawful sexual connection and to all offenders, regardless of their sex or gender identity. Another option would be to redefine rape to include all forms of unlawful sexual connection – taking away the need for the term sexual violation. A third alternative would be to extend the definition of rape to include oral and anal penetration (by a penis) and/or penetration by a body part or object. Within this alternative would be the possibility of a definition of rape that reflects the gendered nature of sexual violence while taking into consideration a more embodied and female-focused experience of sexual violation.

Any reconsideration of the legal definition of rape should involve wide consultation, including with trans, gender diverse, and intersex communities, and any reform must be accompanied by effective and long-term information gathering. This will allow for informed advocacy and document the need for education and awareness among criminal justice professionals as well as making the case for adequate funding for specialised support agencies.

In my view, the position of trans women with regard to legal rape is analogous to the situation of trans people with regard to many areas of the law: invisibility that gives rise to vulnerability. Beginning a discussion as to how the law can both recognise and protect trans women as victims and survivors of sexual violence, rather than rendering them invisible and vulnerable, is an essential (and long overdue) step towards naming, including, and responding to the experiences of the trans and gender diverse communities of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

References

5. PAPER PRESENTATIONS (in alphabetical order)

A woman’s words: What are they worth? Rape in Aotearoa/New Zealand newspapers: 1975–2015

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My masters research forms one component of Associate Professor Jan Jordan’s Marsden scholarship titled *Rape, silencing and objectification: A socio-cultural analysis of barriers to rape reform*. The overall research aim of the project is to explore how the ongoing silencing and objectification of women, as evidenced in a range of media forms (newspapers, women’s magazines, and pornography), contribute to the sociocultural environment in which rape both occurs and is responded to by the police.

Whilst there is a strong base of sexual violence research in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and previous attempts have been made to analyse newspaper representations of rape (Lynch, 2015; Mitchell, 2001; Wood & Dickson, 2013), a literature gap exists on a longitudinal level. My research is looking at depictions of male–female rape (where the woman is aged 16 years or above) in eight prominent Aotearoa/New Zealand newspapers over a 40-year period between 1975 and 2015. Analysing five complete years of reporting (1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2015), my aim is to explore and identify the different ways in which rape is discussed within newspaper articles and assess the extent to which women have been represented, objectified, and silenced in rape reports over time. A further aim is to analyse whether shifts have occurred in relation to the reliance on gender stereotypes and the perpetuation of rape myths. Informed by feminist theory, my research will explore how gendered sexual violence is constructed in articles from Aotearoa/New Zealand’s four main daily newspapers: *The New Zealand Herald*, *The Dominion/Evening Post* (merged as one publication to become *the Dominion Post* in 2002), *The Press*, and the *Otago Daily Times*. These newspapers were selected because they have the highest circulation figures for daily newspapers in Aotearoa/New Zealand and therefore provide a good representation of the way the news, in general, is presented in the Aotearoa/New Zealand press (Thakker & Durrant, 2006). In addition, I selected one national weekly – the *Sunday Star Times* – and two regional newspapers – the *Southland Times* and the *Taranaki Daily News*.

Rape myths play an important role in maintaining a rape culture and aid in ensuring that rape is downplayed and trivialised through the use of victim-blaming language, the objectification of women, and the refusal to acknowledge that rape is a real problem – these are clear indicators that rape myths still exist (Franiuk, Seefelt, Cepress, & Vandello, 2008; Magilsen, 2015; Shariff & DeMartini, 2015). Rape myths, which feed into a ‘rape culture’, underpin how sexual violence is perpetrated and how that behaviour becomes normalised, resulting in its legitimisation not only by the public but also by the media (Franiuk et al., 2008; Soothill & Walby, 1991). Including aspects like victim-blaming rhetoric and sexist language, the newspaper media not only condone a ‘rape culture’ but are most likely unaware they are doing so. Unfortunately, misleading representations of sexual violence in newspapers can affect the sociocultural environment within which rape both occurs and is responded to by members of the criminal justice system.

International research concerning the depiction of rape in the media has highlighted the ways in which news reports sensationalise sexual violence by giving a distorted view of its incidence and nature. Studies have noted that the media disproportionately focus on stranger
rape, gang rape, on unusual or bizarre assaults, and on violence perpetrated against young women (Caringella-MacDonald, 1998; Carter, 2002; Heath, Gordon, & LeBailly, 1981; Kitzinger, 2004; Soothill & Walby, 1991). Media accounts of rape tend to trivialise women’s experiences of the attack or report rapes in a manner that is designed to be titillating or arousing to readers, reiterating the significance of newsworthiness and its ‘mission to entertain’ (Jewkes, 2011). Media images of crime have been argued to reinforce social anxieties, as people are simultaneously fascinated and alarmed by representations of crime (Jewkes, 2011).

The benefits of a longitudinal approach are worth noting. It will provide an important account of changes in two key areas: the changing depiction of women, rape, and sexual assault since the 1970s, and how the Aotearoa/New Zealand media landscape has changed across time with regards to reporting practices concerning sexual violence. It is also important because this large-scale analysis will unpack changes in language used in reports about rape, traditional attitudes towards women, and the way that sexual violence has been presented to the Aotearoa/New Zealand public across a 40-year period during which profound changes have occurred across the media scape and within Aotearoa/New Zealand society itself.

I am currently eight months into my thesis; my data collection phase took approximately four months, even with a research assistant who gave me 100 hours of her time. This involved collecting newspaper articles made available via microfilm for the years 1975, 1985, and some of 1995. The digitisation process began in the mid-late nineties, but only three out of eight newspapers were online by 1995 – the remaining five, I manually microfilmed. This was incredibly time consuming; each day of the eight newspapers had to be viewed for the full 12 months because keyword searching was unavailable. Once I reached 2005 and 2015, online databases were used to search for articles, which sped up the process immensely!

Although my work is still in progress, it is already indicating new areas that are worthy of mention. The length of reports has changed across time – articles in 1975 were much shorter, factual court reports, whereas articles became longer from 1985 and images were introduced. In 1995, full page spreads dominated, perhaps brought on by the high-profile serial rapist case of Joseph Thompson, which swamped the press. From 2005 onwards, discussion emerged from practitioners, academics, and politicians around ‘rape culture’ – although sensationalist headlines still persisted and newspapers disproportionately focused on stranger rape, gang rape, or unusual and bizarre assaults, a trend that is consistent across all five years. Despite this positive change, I have also noticed an overwhelming number of articles that used the ‘male voice’ as the dominant narrative of the piece. Regardless of the journalist’s gender, it is predominantly men (as criminal justice system practitioners or the male perpetrators themselves) speaking to ‘us’ in news reports; illustrating that newspaper media prioritise men’s voices as dominant narratives. While men retain the controlling voice, speaking out about or for women, it is difficult to see how rape culture might shift.

I know of no other published research that attempts to document depictions of rape and women’s representations across a 40-year period with regards to the publications I have selected. I will attempt to build on foundations established by previous Aotearoa/New Zealand research to gain a deeper insight into this topic and ultimately to dispel societal attitudes about sexual violence and how they present as barriers to rape reform. I want to not only do the project justice but also be aware of my abilities and limitations. Despite challenges, I need to remind myself that I am contributing to an important project, and I hope my study will make a significant contribution to the Aotearoa/New Zealand sexual violence and criminological literature and ultimately be used as a platform for other researchers to proceed.
Girls can do anything: Reflections on a feminist initiative

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Women's Studies Association member

‘Girls can do anything’, the phrase, has entered popular New Zealand culture, though its origin may not be remembered. The phrase came into use in 1983 in a public education programme designed to encourage more girls to take up trades and become apprentices – a large area of the workforce from which women were absent.

As the women’s advisory officer at that time at the Vocational Training Council (VTC), a quango responsible for trade training and apprenticeships, I designed and ran the programme, which I called ‘Women across the workforce.’

My job was just one of a number of women’s advocacy jobs within the public sector. As well as mine, concerned with women’s training, there was one within the then Labour Department, to promote women’s employment opportunities, and when the Labour Party took office in 1984, they added three jobs to the Department of Education – women’s education officers – for schools, for continuing education, and for Māori and Pacific women. Soon after, these specialist advocacy jobs were joined by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.

Such public service positions were established through pressure from the second-wave feminism in the 1970s. They were in uncharted territory, trying to change attitudes in society generally, to give women and girls better opportunities. The ‘Women across the workforce’ public education programme was devised to change mind-sets about women’s suitability for apprenticeships – not just of employers and industry training boards but of girls and women, parents, careers advisers in schools – anyone who might have a hand in helping girls leaving...
school with career choices.

The public education programme was really more of a public relations campaign. It included a number of disparate elements, taking advantage of some government initiatives that no longer exist:

- The then Vocational Guidance section of the Labour Department agreed to send out material in their regular mail-outs for schools. They sent pamphlets, a poster, and a pack with background information about apprenticeships and a list I had compiled of women apprentices who would be prepared to speak to school groups or give information to a school careers adviser. The pamphlets were ‘personal viewpoints’, true accounts by young women apprentices about their jobs.
- Vocational Guidance also sent out an attractive poster promoting apprenticeships, etc., and incorporating the words ‘girls can do anything.’
- The then Continuing Education Unit of Radio New Zealand agreed to play on Radio New Zealand’s commercial stations some brief snappy pieces on the subject (as well as some rather longer ‘think pieces’ for National Radio).

An unusual feature for a programme organised by a governmental body was the effort to enlist a nationwide network of women in feminist groups like the Women’s Studies Association and ask them to make a noise about the programme: could they listen out for the broadcasts and comment on them; would they offer to speak about the subject to local groups such as Rotary; would they send letters to the newspapers, and so forth. They were sent briefing packs – and I calculated that, even if one in ten responded, the effort was worth it.

The campaign also used other media outlets:

- We had a spot-on TV news for the VTC Director to show off the ‘Personal viewpoint’ pamphlets and promote women in apprenticeships.
- We had an article in the *New Zealand Woman’s Weekly*.
- National Radio’s morning programme, hosted by Sharon Crosbie, later CEO of Radio New Zealand, included a fortnight of interviews with young women in non-traditional jobs.
- Most importantly, TVNZ agreed to do some community service advertisements, which were made free for non-profit organisations and shown when their advertising slots were not full. When the couple of months designated for the programme were nearly over, the TV ads began to air at odd times, and caught people’s imagination.

Each advertisement featured as a closing tag line, the phrase ‘girls can do anything.’ That is what the campaign became known as and when the phrase entered the national psyche. Feminist networks kept it alive to begin with – it popped up on merchandise at women’s conferences and the like – and soon it had a life of its own.

So how successful was the programme? It was intended to change attitudes and encourage young women into non-traditional trades. In 1982, females made up 7.8% of all apprentices. In 2015, they made up 7.9%. In spite of the wide reach of the campaign, it was completely unsuccessful. Trade jobs have powerful traditions and histories, and trade working places are often jealously guarded male preserves. Attitudinal change is hard to achieve – I am of the view now that it probably needed a much longer period than it had.

But there were some unintended consequences. The tag line did enter New Zealand popular culture. I think it did make a difference to how women felt about themselves in ways I had not envisaged. It was a time when women were trying to make progress on a number of fronts, and anything that encouraged women to ‘have a go’ generally had to be useful. It probably helped more women contemplate a wider range of professional jobs (law, dentistry, etc.) than trade jobs. Then and now, we have to believe that, given half a chance, girls – and women – can do anything.
Hohou te rongo kahukura – outing violence: Building rainbow communities free of partner and sexual violence

SANDRA DICKSON
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Sex, sexuality, and gender diverse communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand began new conversations about intimate partner and sexual violence in Rainbow communities in 2015 to raise awareness of such violence and gather information to inform resource and service development. These conversations became the ‘Hohou Te Rongo Kahukura – Outing Violence’ project, led by the author with advisory group members from Box Events Oceania, Evolve Youth Health Centre, Inside OUT, New Zealand Prostitutes Collective, Outerspaces, OUTline, Pacific Futures, Rainbow Youth, Te Kaha o Te Rangatahi, Te Ohaakii a Hine – National Network Ending Sexual Violence Together, Tiwhanawhana, and the Village Collective.

In establishing Hohou Te Rongo Kahukura – Outing Violence, definitions were important. ‘Hohou Te Rongo Kahukura’ invites the cultivation of peace and healthy relationships inside Rainbow communities, between people and peoples. This means addressing the structural inequalities and violence of transphobia, biphobia, homophobia, misogyny, racism, and colonisation is critical to building Rainbow communities without violence. ‘Outing Violence’ acknowledges the isolation of Rainbow survivors, left out by dominant understandings of partner and sexual violence, who may not receive support they need.

Historically, here and elsewhere, violence inside Rainbow communities has been referred to as ‘lesbian and gay’, or more recently, ‘same-sex’ partner violence. These framings leave out many in the Rainbow community. For example, bisexual and/or trans women in relationships with men who use violence may experience biphobia and/or transphobia that structures that violence in specific ways. Biphobic pressure to be sexually available and ‘prove’ attractions to sexual partners provide the context for understanding emerging evidence that indicates bisexual women may experience sexual violence at significantly higher rates than lesbians or heterosexual women (Walters, Chen, & Breiding, 2013). Violence towards trans women is often excused by a kind of ‘trans panic’, suggesting those using violence were ‘deceived’, and trans women are often unwelcome in women’s services (James et al., 2016). Hohou Te Rongo Kahukura – Outing Violence therefore addressed violence towards people in ‘Rainbow relationships’, defined as any relationship in which at least one person identifies as sex, sexuality, or gender diverse.

Feminists have fought fiercely to shift understanding of the scale and impacts of men’s violence towards women in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Successes over the last 40 years include feminist services, more protective legislation, and changing state systems to better recognise the impacts of victimisation. Grass-roots feminists have led this work to support women recovering after gendered violence. Today, these shifts in understanding are still vulnerable to being undermined by so-called men’s rights activists who argue men experience victimisation at similar rates to women.

This is the context for the lack of attention to gendered violence inside Rainbow communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand and elsewhere. Despite growing evidence of concerning levels of such violence inside Rainbow communities (Fileborn, 2012), the issue is yet to receive consistent attention or resource, including from feminists. Yet, examining Rainbow community violence provides opportunities to expand feminist theoretical understandings and, ultimately, develop more successful strategies for building communities without gendered violence.
This is not new thinking. Wāhine Māori, for example, have repeatedly challenged Pākehā feminist understandings by prioritising colonisation when seeking to comprehend violence towards Māori women. Māori feminists aim far beyond the patriarchy when they point to the protective importance of mana wāhine and mana tāne or the harms of language repression and land theft. These challenges, and others, improve understanding and responses to gendered violence.

Hohou Te Rongo Kahukura – Outing Violence sought to raise awareness of partner and sexual violence in the Rainbow community in multiple ways in 2015/2016. The project developed a website with Rainbow-specific information, factsheets, and pathways to existing support. Eighteen community hui around the country included specific hui for Māori, Pasifika, and Asian people, trans people, young people, and general Rainbow community audiences. The focus was dynamics of Rainbow partner violence, sexual violence, the law, and consent. Finally, a survey to explore the sexual and relationship experiences of sex, sexuality, and gender diverse people over the age of 16 years in New Zealand received 407 responses. Rainbow media covered all aspects of the project online, in print, and on radio, and many articles were shared hundreds of times.

Feedback from community hui and the survey results make sobering reading (Dickson, 2016). High levels of a variety of different kinds of partner and sexual abuse, severe impacts across a range of health indicators, and disturbingly poor experiences of help-seeking were reported, including experiences and fears relating to discrimination.

The ethical imperative for including violence in Rainbow communities in feminist analyses of gendered violence concerns emerging evidence of high levels of victimisation. The analytical imperative concerns growing better responses to violence, with more accurate understandings of the interplay of complex structural power relations in the lived realities of women, trans, and gender diverse people of all genders and/or non-heterosexual men.

The final imperative that should not be overlooked concerns framing. The primary pushback against feminist-driven shifts in understanding of gendered violence comes from so-called men’s rights activists. Partner violence between women is increasingly being used to support claims not only that men experience victimisation but that women may be as violent as men. Without feminist understandings driving these conversations and relationships between Rainbow communities and feminist experts in gendered violence, there may well be significant risks of Rainbow community violence being used to further de-gender partner and sexual violence.

References


Women artists are often seen as less successful than their male counterparts, with their works achieving less at auction houses and commercial galleries. Women artists are also too often under-represented and have been largely ignored in the history of art. Anne McCahon (née Hamblett, 1915–1993) is no exception to this. Today, she is best known as the wife of New Zealand’s foremost painter, Colin McCahon (1919–1987), though she was in fact an artist in her own right. Very little is known about the works that Anne produced, yet she was described by her contemporary Rodney Kennedy (1909–1989) as ‘the best artist of her generation’ – he tended to favour her works over Colin McCahon’s. Anne stopped painting in the mid-1940s when she was caught between the choice of family and career and, like many other women of her time, she went for the first option. However, she did manage to pursue other forms of art outside of the more traditional painting genre: clothing, dressmaking, sketches, illustrations (for children’s books and Aotearoa/New Zealand’s School Journals), and pottery. These types of art, while often considered as a lower status than that of painting, are reflective of the time: of a woman’s role in her family and in society. Because family was so important to Anne, this short essay examines her ink and pencil sketches of her children in comparison with those by her husband, Colin.

Why did Anne McCahon stop painting in the mid-1940s? It is rumoured that her famous husband once said, ‘there’s only place for one artist in this family’, though this can be interpreted in a number of ways. Perhaps Colin forced his artistic rival to step to one side, perhaps he believed that a woman’s role was that of a wife and supporter, or perhaps he felt that there was simply not enough time or money for two full-time artists in the household – and his fervent desire to paint certainly would have overshadowed Anne’s needs. Anne certainly could not have found the time to be an exhibiting artist with gallery representation – by April 1949 she had four children to look after. Her life was busy but fulfilling, and her children played a central role in this.

Even though very few portraits exist in Anne’s oeuvre (whereas many lie in Colin’s), she did complete studies of two of her children, William and Catherine. Her first portrait, *William McCahon as a baby* (1943) presents the baby lying on his back, staring over his right shoulder with his fingers placed near or in his mouth. The innocence of the baby is captured in the soft application of ink and roundness of the figure’s form. The gentleness of the work is markedly different from Colin’s work of the same subject: *Red baby* (1945), a watercolour on paper where William is red-faced and crying. However, there is an elegance to Colin’s work, with the baby’s natural movements: he reaches up towards his mother’s face, where she lovingly looks down at him. Although he has depicted his wife in a chair, Colin diverges from the ‘Madonna and Child’ tradition of idealised figures with serene facial expressions. Instead, he touches on the reality of parenting a small baby. With both figures simplified in form and outlined with soft, flowing ink, he connects the two figures and thereby emphasises the timeless bond between mother and child.

Colin’s interpretation of his first daughter – *Catherine Anne McCahon* (1945) – is strikingly different to his rendition of William. At only six weeks old, Catherine (1945–2006) appears mature and wise. She stares out to her right with a calm but somewhat tired expression, as if assessing her surroundings carefully. Anne’s two analyses of Catherine, both in pencil, are much more childlike and linked with her first portrait of William. Catherine is playing with
her foot in one and tugging on her chin and bottom lip in the other. In this latter work, there is a similarity with Colin’s approach in that she stares out to the right, but Anne shows her first daughter with an effervescent look in her eye. Comparing these works of Catherine by Anne and Colin gives one a sense of their different parenting roles. Anne was the primary caregiver for the children – she nursed them and played with them, getting to see their curious side. Colin, on the other hand, was often away with work and only saw his children intermittently. When he did manage to spend time with them, he would no doubt have studied their behaviour and personalities.

Anne combined her interest in children and love of illustration in subsequent ventures: Her book illustrations and contribution to New Zealand’s School Journals are exceptional examples and were extremely successful. Though Anne was never to pick up a paintbrush after the mid-1940s, her illustrations and artworks outside of the painting genre are exemplary and they give remarkable insight into a woman artist’s approach to art.

Diaspora of disaffection: Gender role reproduction among global Indian middling migrant housewives

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Economic liberalisation and labour market growth has created a global demand for highly skilled labour, particularly in the field of information technology (IT), leading, in the last decade or so, to large-scale migration of highly skilled, high-earning professionals out of India to the West. While there is considerable literature on the relationship between low skills, poor settlement outcomes, and socioeconomic disadvantage among Indian migrants, there is far less understanding of the migrant experiences of highly skilled and affluent workers referred to widely as ‘middling migrants’ (Ryan, Klewowski, Kopennfels, & Mulholland, 2015; see also Conradson & Latham, 2005). Middling migrants are a diverse category of footloose and mobile migrants falling between the disadvantaged migrant and elite international sojourners, and are usually categorised as highly skilled immigrants in a higher income category. Middling migrants are a unique phenomenon, and signal a migration experience that goes beyond the dichotomy of poor versus affluent. In particular, the gendered dimension of the middling migration phenomenon is poorly researched, and the women in this process of migration remain largely invisible (Raj, 2003; Radhakrishnan, 2008).

Women are often part of this new wave of migrants in the form of ‘tied’ middling migrants. Tied middling migrant women are essentially a group of women accompanying their male spouses who are skilled, middle-class, migrant professionals working in transnational locations. In the particular context of Indian migration, they are typically middle or upper class, urban, university educated, or professionals themselves. As a result, the circumstances of these women may be unlike those of other migrant women. They may not be affected by problems such as poverty, social isolation, or language barriers as is commonly associated with new migrants in a (primarily Western) country. Instead, what the tied middling migrant women experience are a form of ‘re-privatisation’ of gender roles as they assume private (as homemakers) and public (as hostesses) domestic activities in support of their husband’s career. Even when they do advance personal interests – often through hobbies and learning of new arts and interests – the foreclosing of their erstwhile professional identity creates a strong undercurrent of disaffection. The re-domestication of middling migrant women away from previous professional and public
roles has implications for their sense of personal empowerment and, from the fledgling research and anecdotal narratives available, has implications for their mental health and wellbeing. As the numbers of these women are very small, and because they do not present with problems arising out of structural or racial inequality at a wider social scale, they are, by and large, an invisible category within both migration research and gender research.

Furthermore, as their domestication evolves within a global context, these ‘trailing spouses’ occupy a contradictory gendered positioning within the Indian diaspora. On the one hand, they are perceived as global Indian middle-class trendsetters embodying modernity, whereas, on the other hand, the evolution of their roles as domestic women engenders the perpetuation of neo-traditional gender roles within the family structure. Questions therefore arise about their identity – are they global mascots of an ideal hyper-modernist migrant Indian woman or are they, in reality, despite the trappings of modernity, merely in keeping with the cultural continuity of what an ideal Indian woman is? How is empowerment at one level, i.e. economic and personal social freedom, to be read against the social reproduction of conservative and masculinist forms of gender roles? Finally, what do tied middling women represent for the Indian diaspora?

Against this background, a research project is being developed that explores the fragmented construction of tied middling women within the Indian diaspora, outlining the particular gender role reproductions experienced by these women. I argue that what is being evidenced within this group in some ways parallels the experience outlined by Betty Friedan (2001) in The feminine mystique of American middle-class women in the 1960s, albeit within new temporal, spatial, and social contexts. Friedan’s 2001 study of social and cultural reproduction of heteronormative patriarchy is explored in the global, cultural context of the ‘middling migrant women’ and how they use this social reproduction pattern to alternately ‘complete and compete’ the renegotiation of their identity.

References


Pay equity: Update on the Kristine Bartlett caregivers claim

LINDA HILL

In 2013, caregiver Kristine Bartlett was paid just $NZ14.35 an hour, after 20 years’ experience caring for the elderly. She and her union made a claim against her employer under the Equal Pay Act 1972 (EPA), arguing that her skills and responsibilities were being undervalued because caring was ‘women’s work.’

Income data since 1974 show the gender pay gap narrows when governments take policy action (Fig. 1). As in both 1990 and 2008, National reversed the pay equity policies of the
previous Labour government; progress under the current National government was unlikely, so the unions decided to try the courts. In recent judgments, the Employment Court seemed receptive to arguments for equal treatment. The Service & Food Workers Union (now E Tū) had just won a case against Bartlett’s employer, Terranova Homes & Care, for deducting an increase in the employers’ contribution to Kiwisaver from its employees’ pay packets, bringing some below the legal minimum (Vasivasi v. Terranova Homes & Care Ltd, 2012).

There was a perception by some that the Equal Pay Act required equal pay in the same job, but not equal pay for work of equal value in women’s and men’s typically different jobs. This view arose because the last case taken, by the Clerical Workers Unions in 1986, had ‘fallen on fallow ground’, to quote the Employment Court (Bartlett v. Terranova Homes & Care Ltd, 2013, at 72). Terranova argued it was paying its employees equally because 120 women carers were on the same rates as four male carers. The Employment Court ruled that parliament had indeed addressed equal pay for work of equal value in s.3(1)(b) of the Act, which specifies work done predominantly or exclusively by women. The Act was less clear on choosing male comparators for these women, but in the opinion of the court:

the comparator to be identified must be free from any gender bias in regards to the rate of pay if the purposes of the Act are to be achieved …. If a comparator that is uninfected by gender discrimination cannot be found within the workplace or the sector it may be necessary to look more broadly, to jobs to which a similar value can be attributed using gender neutral criteria. (Bartlett v. Terranova Homes & Care Ltd, 2013, at [44] and [46])

This was confirmed by the Appeal Court (despite the Attorney-General appearing in support of Terranova), and the Supreme Court declined further appeal.

The Employment Court also confirmed that unions may ask it to issue principles for the implementation of equal pay under s.9, although this had not been done in 40 years. The next steps were for the union to request principles, and for the parties to decide on suitable comparators for caregivers and continue negotiations, with recourse to the court if necessary.

However, in late 2015, the government set up two working groups representing unions, employers, and the State Services Commission. One was to develop principles instead of the court; the other was to settle Kristine Bartlett’s claim. The government undertook to extend the settlement to all state-funded residential and home care, except for mental health (traditionally more male dominated and higher paid). However, the April 2016 budget did not specify funding for these wage increases.

Meanwhile, claims for social workers and special education support workers were lodged under the Equal Pay Act, and midwives applied for a judicial review of their contract rates on grounds of gender discrimination. The Campaign for Equal Value Equal Pay (CEVEP) was an invited ‘intervener’ in the Employment Court case, so requested participation in the principles working group (see Hill, 2013). Instead, crown facilitator Dame Patsy Reddy allowed written submissions. We submitted that (as in the aborted 1990 claims) work done predominantly by
women should be compared with two or more comparators doing male-dominated work in male-dominated sectors.

In the settlement working group, the unions presented information on 14 comparable male jobs, supporting a claim of $NZ25–26 an hour. The unions preferred to avoid lengthy, technical complex job evaluations, as four years’ work by Labour’s Pay & Employment Equity Office had not reached the point of pay-outs. They were also influenced by the more discursive approach of successful pay equity cases in the Queensland and Australian Federal courts, albeit under very different legislation from that in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

In late May, the principles working group presented recommendations to cabinet. These largely reflected the Act and the new case law, but included historical, social, and structural evidence in establishing the initial ‘merit of the claim’, as well as later in pay equity bargaining (as permitted by the Judgement). The contentious phrase ‘same or similar work’ is used, despite the court’s interpretation of 3(1)(b) as covering different work typically done by women or men. In her report, Dame Patsy mentioned the importance of pay transparency and providing expert support – both matters raised by CEVEP.

On November 24, the government announced its acceptance of the principles but added a ‘supplementary principle to require that comparators be drawn from within the business, similar businesses, or the same industry or sector when available (i.e. that there would be a hierarchy of potential comparators)’ (State Services Commission, 2015). The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) does not support this starting point, as it will ‘waste time and create unnecessary paper work’ (New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 2016). In CEVEP’s view, it seeks to wind back the Court rulings to something closer to Terranova’s position.

The government stated it will ‘update’ the Equal Pay Act and amend the Employment Relations Act to implement the recommended principles (Nicoll & Clayton, 2017). This is quite unnecessary. Principles developed by the court would have been issued as a statement under s.9 of the Act. Alternatively, s.19 allows them to be issued as a regulation by cabinet and the Governor-General (the newly appointed Dame Patsy).

If the government plans to alter the Equal Pay Act and Employment Relations Act next year, we need to watch them very carefully indeed. We also need to ensure, in election year, that other political parties take action to defend women’s right to pay equity.

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Universal basic income: Time for feminists to push this proposal?

PRUE HYMAN

In introducing a discussion on universal basic income (UBI), I recalled that in 1998 I gave a paper at a Women’s Studies Association (WSA) conference asking whether UBI was a useful
policy for feminists. No governments or political parties were prepared to push it at that time, and the movement almost died in Aotearoa/New Zealand over the 18 years since then. More recently, it has revived, and the policy is being trialled in several parts of the world. With the mess of the welfare system and the appalling rise in Aotearoa/New Zealand inequality and its consequences for many groups, particularly women and children, I argued that it is time to try again here. The case is further strengthened by the casualisation of paid work and the prospect of technological change, including robots, eroding further paid job numbers.

Some writers in Aotearoa/New Zealand have long advocated for UBI and kept advocacy for it going – including Keith Rankin and Lowell Manning, more recently and publicly joined by Gareth Morgan and Susan Guthrie in *The big kahuna* (though Morgan has not made its immediate introduction part of his new party policy – The Opportunities Party [TOP]). In addition, the Green and Labour parties are at least flirting with the idea.

UBI is a policy that can appeal to those on the right, as well as those on the left, which makes me a shade cautious about it – it might not be set at a level sufficient to avoid poverty for some of those not in paid work.

**Background – why now?**

- Neo-liberal economics unabated.
- Union power decimated/huge switch of rewards from labour to capital.
- Increased inequality, and alarming levels of relative poverty.
- Women and ethnic minorities are particularly affected – Māori, Pacific, and refugees disproportionately disadvantaged.
- This gives attention to both labour market and social/welfare aspects – and needs feminist/women-specific measures and general measures aimed at race and class disadvantage (general situation, philosophy, and policies have more impact on the position of women than do gender-specific policies).
- So, work on pay equity but also minimum and living wage and reduction of earnings differentials (maximum wage? Ratio of top to bottom no more than ten to one?) – and on sole parent policy (mostly women) and UBI.

**Rationales**

- Living income for all
- Poverty alleviation
- Simplicity
- Reduction of administrative expense of targeting
- Removal of stigma and policing of benefits
- Reduction of poverty traps/incentive problems
- Freeing up of decisions on amounts of paid work
- Social dividend on publicly owned assets
- Compensation for increasing concentration of wealth
- Social responsibility of government/community
- Recognition of citizenship, community, and interdependence;
- Recognition of contributions to society in unpaid household, caring, voluntary, and community work
- Arbitrary nature of what is and is not paid
- Realism about the way paid work is being replaced by automation – insufficient adequately paid work.
UBI is not revolutionary

- We already have a UBI for people aged 65 years and over – and used to have a child UBI (family benefit 1946/1991).
- Universality versus targeting: universal benefits attract far less stigma (65+), but are expensive (NZS is 47% of welfare spending).
- Why give it to those who do not need it? But targeting has major problems (the Work and Income New Zealand [WINZ] nightmares) and with good tax policies, the ‘well off’ still contribute.

Problems seen with UBI

- How is it paid for? Lots of options – but needs to be strongly redistributive – e.g. capital and/or capital gains taxes, more progressive income tax, resource taxes, financial transactions tax.
- Will it mean people will leave paid work in droves? No – on the evidence – and many that do will be doing important unpaid work.
- Problems for feminists: it will not be set high enough on affordability grounds so sole parents (and others on low incomes) could be even worse off. How are children treated? UBI at half adult levels?

It is time to get a number of options for UBI properly costed, with alternative ways of funding it, though it is not easy – the numbers are large:

- 1.1 million children aged under 18 years – $40 per week – 1.1 million × 40 × 52 = $2300 million (2.3 billion); $100 per week – 5750 million (5.75 billion) – still less than the maximum Working for Families (WFF) for lowest-income families, including in work credit – and $200 per week adult UBI is not high enough. Even at that level, about $36 billion on UBI (adults only). The minimum wage for a 40-hour week is $610, whereas the NZS for a single person living alone is $443.43 (both before paying tax).
- But Basic Income New Zealand (BINZ) argues that the amount of redistribution needed to eliminate poverty is small, just a few percent of our economic output.

‘NEW’ FACES OF FEMINISM: YOUNG FEMINISTS

New faces of feminism: Feminism in schools

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One of three papers in the New faces of feminism symposium, Feminism in schools presented preliminary findings from my recent research working with girls who participate in high school-based feminist clubs. These clubs suggest a significant cultural moment that has little, if any, historical precedent in high school activism, and they coincide with the clearly documented rising activism and feminist identification amongst young women, who are railing against gendered sexual inequities. ‘Slutwalks’ and street protests about the rape culture underpinning the highly publicised Roast Busters case exemplify the strongly felt anger of many young women about sexual double standards and the normalisation of sexual violence against women. My paper excavated examples of a broader cultural shift, some might argue appropriation, in which feminism was no longer a dirty word but one claimed by a succession
of prominent high-profile celebrities such as Emma Watson, Beyoncé, Miley Cyrus, and our own home-grown Lorde. It also highlighted the crucial role of digital media as a significant site of feminism’s reinvigoration, both as a well of knowledge about feminism and as a mode of young women’s resistance to sexism, sexual violence, and misogyny.

Having set out the cultural landscape in which contemporary young feminisms are appearing, the remainder of the paper focused on discussing a recent project in which 35 Feminist Club girls aged between 15 and 17 years participated in a two-stage research project. In this paper, though, I focused on the second stage (post focus groups) about feminism and digital media in which I interviewed individual girls about the websites and social media they engaged with in relation to feminism, using a laptop loaded with screen recording software and audio-recording equipment to dually record the conversation and sites visited during the interview. Presenting the range of digital media girls interacted with to the audience gave some a feel for both the diversity and the commonalities of girls’ participation in feminism – sites ranged from Buzzfeed, YouTube, and Rookie magazine through to Stuff and The Guardian online. I discussed how girls primarily used digital media to expand their feminist knowledge and much less so to post on open (publicly viewed) sites. This reluctance to post connected to concerns about ‘trolls’ and abuse as well as feeling too ‘new’ to feminism and possibly embarrassing themselves in the eyes of older, more experienced feminists. In marked contrast, girls uniformly participated in the safety of their closed Feminist Club Facebook page and some had feminist Tumblr and Instagram pages. I noted that girls’ desire to share knowledge about feminism – to ‘educate others’ – dominated as a reason for their participation in digital media; re-posting was a key activity in this regard. Digital media resourced their learning about feminism and broadened its focus to global concerns, particularly its intersections with racism. In addition to the sense of belonging to a feminist community that the Feminist Club engendered, digital media connected them to multiple feminist communities and multiple activisms. But the online and offline were not mutually exclusive; rather they intertwined. For example, Facebook and Tumblr worked as sites for offline protest action or generating support for fundraising events (e.g. Rape Crisis; protests to counter anti-abortion activism).

It was intended that three of the girls from one of the Feminist Clubs would also present a paper in the symposium, giving a history of the club, outlining club activities, and talking about what feminism meant to them. Unfortunately, school policies ultimately prevented them from attending, but they provided a link to a video made about the club and its zine-making activities to be played at the conference (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHuIGC5xKzo). Together, the digital aspects of girls’ feminist practice that I presented and the excerpt of the video made by the girls underlined that although there are ‘new’ directions in young feminism, assisted by the world opened up to young women through digital media, there are also abiding connections with feminisms of earlier eras.

This paper has since been developed and submitted to Feminism & Psychology, titled Young feminists, feminism and digital media.
The fashionable new face of feminism? Constructions of celebrity feminism in online media

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Not so long ago, McRobbie (2004) claimed that young women had to ritually deny feminism in order to maintain social standing and sexual appeal. Now, however, some of the most successful and influential young women of our culture are calling themselves feminists. From Amy Schumer to Lena Dunham, Taylor Swift, to our very own Lorde – celebrity feminists are everywhere. Yet, celebrity feminism is a fiercely contested site where debates about the meaning and purpose of feminism are reproduced and negotiated.

The different responses to celebrity feminism highlight the gendered nature of celebrity as male celebrity feminists are celebrated, while female celebrities have their feminism scrutinised. Female celebrities are also questioned by older peers who are seen as established feminist voices. Generational tensions in definitions of feminism persist, as do questions about sexual agency, what counts as feminism, and who is allowed to identify as feminist.

In blogs and response comments, internet users construct and negotiate the meanings of celebrity feminism. A discourse of authenticity is used to construct celebrity feminism as inauthentic and a distraction from ‘real’ feminism. Celebrities’ position vis à vis capitalism and the status quo invalidated their feminist credentials for some writers. However, drawing on different definitions of political action, other commentators argued that celebrities do have a role to play in contemporary feminism. Postfeminist discourses were invoked in some blog posts to laud celebrities as high-profile success stories, while in others were used as criteria to judge celebrities as apolitical. When the contradictions of celebrity feminism are compared with the difficulties facing all women in a postfeminist media culture, celebrity feminism is revealed as a crucial site for the reworking of contemporary feminism.

Celebrities are an influential source of feminism, especially for young women who are competent cultural consumers of internet media. Celebrity feminism offers the potential to bridge popular culture and academia. Yet, it is in the debate surrounding the meaning and relevance of celebrity feminism online that long-standing feminist debates are reinvigorated. The discussion that plays out in blogs and comment sections raises profound questions about who can claim a feminist identity and who can judge the feminism of others.

This presentation has since been submitted for publication to Feminist Media Studies as Blogging the celebrity feminist: Policing and (im)possibilities.

Doing it differently in Rookie: Girls, sexuality, and online feminism

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Girls are growing up in a ‘postfeminist’ climate that strongly influences what it means to be a girl and to be sexual as a girl. Within ‘postfeminism’, girls can be sexual and desiring but only in highly limited ways. Girls’ magazines have long been contradictory spaces, constructing heterosexual desire as normative on the one hand but as problematic, risky, and inappropriate on the other.

Although girls’ magazines remain a popular source of information about sexuality, the internet offers girls an expanded resource that nonetheless reproduces contradictory discourses of girls’ sexuality. Rookie stands out as one of the few examples of a feminist-inspired magazine
for girls and is readily available to them online. Furthermore, much of Rookie’s content is written for girls by girls, drawing inspiration from other feminist media like Riot Grrrl, where readers have often held dual roles as both consumers and producers of feminist media.

In this paper, I explored how the feminist underpinnings of Rookie might be reflected in the information and messages given to girls about sexuality. I discussed my analysis of seven blog posts from the sex+love category of the magazine, which identified three main constructions of sexuality: sexuality as emotional learning; sexuality as a project, and sexuality as diverse.

These blog posts interrogated dominant discourses that construct an exclusionary ‘postfeminist’ girlhood sexual subjectivity that requires girls to be both sexy and asexual, constantly self-regulating and self-improving to get it ‘right.’ Rookie offered a diverse range of sexual subjectivities underpinned by feminist values of pluralism, autonomy, and choice. Girls were encouraged to find sexual empowerment through experimentation and exploration. The heterosexual norm was rejected and same-sex desire, queer-centric sex, bisexuality, aromanticism, and celibacy were discussed as a few of the many facets of a possible sexual subjectivity.

Although intersectional values were a clear focus of the online magazine, Rookie tended to represent a dominant, White voice, suggesting that Rookie is speaking to and for a narrow demographic group. Nevertheless, Rookie is an interesting case of how girls are engaging with online feminism, especially in a context where the legitimacy of the internet as a space for feminist activism is being called into question. A feminist-oriented magazine like Rookie offers girls a way to engage with feminist politics, talking back to the dominant discourses that problematically construct their world.

Growing up with hardcore: Exploring the meanings of pornography in the digital age

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The internet’s rapid development since the 1990s has changed the way people interact with and utilise its functionality. Pornography is a popularly accessed media form on the internet, and some research indicates that pornography accounts for as much as 25% of all internet traffic on search engines (DeKeseredy & Corsianos, 2016). Despite the expansive digital landscape of internet pornography, critical criminological perspectives on the influence of pornography are limited (DeKeseredy, 2015). Further, there is little Aotearoa/New Zealand-specific research on this topic, with the most recent study exploring young men’s views on the appeal of pornography (Antevska & Gavey, 2015). There is also little work addressing the meanings young people attribute to the pornography they view, nor their ideas about the perceived or real effects of pornography on their lives. This research addresses this literature gap by exploring the role that pornography may play in heterosexual New Zealanders’ ideas, perceptions, and experiences of sex and intimacy in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This study is funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand through Associate Professor Jan Jordan’s Marsden scholarship titled Rape, silencing and objectification: A socio-cultural analysis of barriers to rape reform.

Feminists have long been concerned about the impact of pornography on men’s real-life perpetration of violence against women, especially sexual violence. Early research on the content of pornographic magazines suggested that sexual and physical violence was a common portrayal (Malamuth & Spinner, 1980; Matacin & Burger, 1987), and recent analyses of video
pornography have identified staggeringly high rates of aggression that is overwhelmingly directed at female performers who respond either positively or ambivalently to experiencing such violence (Bridges, Wosnitzer, Scharrer, Sun, & Liberman, 2010). These levels of aggression are said to not be mediated by the gender of the director (Sun, Bridges, Wosnitzer, Scharrer, & Liberman, 2008), perhaps suggesting that female pornography producers are still driven to produce content that reflects the desires and tastes of its target audience – primarily heterosexual men. That said, alternative studies employing differing definitions or interpretations of aggression find low levels of violence, especially sexual violence (McKee, Albury, & Lumby, 2008; Monk-Turner & Purcell, 1999), thus suggesting that concerns about the violent portrayal of sex in video pornography are unwarranted.

Whilst pornography continues to exist in print and video formats, it is now most regularly accessed via the internet, which hosts a seemingly endless menu of sexually explicit material, catering to a vast array of viewer wants, tastes, and desires (Tibbals, 2014). Much pornographic content is now available free of charge, especially via pornographic ‘tube’ sites, which act as a hub for user-generated and professionally produced pornography, whilst fostering a sense of community (Smith, Barker, & Attwood, 2015). Analyses of the type of pornographic media available online are surprisingly scarce; however, research suggests that images on pay-per-view internet rape pornography websites show men largely in control of women’s bodies, and women are the most likely recipients of sexual violence (Gossett & Byrne, 2002). Further, a recent study of representations of female sexuality on pornographic online magazine sites locates these images as primarily for the male gaze and frequently depicting themes of sexual inequality (Shim, Kwon, & Cheng, 2015). A study by Gorman, Monk-Turner, and Fish (2010) noted that, although violence (i.e. slapping, bondage, hitting, kicking, hair-pulling) is not always present in online pornographic videos,

women’s acts of submission, or an eagerness to perform any sexual act were present … the message that women are naturally willing to perform almost any act may be, in part, why force was not common. (p. 142)

Recent data suggest that young people are frequent users of pornography, and that young women between the ages of 18 and 25 years are a rapidly growing group of pornography users, possibly indicating a generational shift (Smith et al., 2015). Research with young people about pornography often focuses entirely on the harm that exposure to sexually explicit material has on young people’s thinking about sex and sexuality (Flood, 2007, 2009). Many young people are turning to pornography as a form of sexual inspiration and education (Lofgren-Martenson & Mansson, 2010; Mattebo, Larsson, Tyden, Olsson, & Haggstrom-Nordin, 2012), and there are concerns that exposure to the content of mainstream pornography might encourage young people to engage in unethical or risky sexual behaviours.

In light of these concerns, this research investigates the meanings that pornography may play in young people’s perceptions and experiences of sex, intimacy, relationships, and the self in Aotearoa/New Zealand. It is written at a time when hardcore pornography is more accessible on the internet than ever before, and academics are concerned about the impacts of the wider pornification of society, especially for young people. Using semi-structured interviews, this study intends to interview key professionals working with people affected by pornography, as well as a sample of 18- to 30-year-old heterosexual New Zealanders, both male and female. Further, this study also intends to conduct a series of online, gender-specific focus groups about young people’s experiences and perceptions of pornography in relation to their sexual behaviours, intimacy, relationships, body image, and self-esteem. It is hoped that this research, whilst still in progress, will contribute to the Aotearoa/New Zealand literature on pornography and provide an insight into the influences of a popular media format on the lives of young New Zealanders exposed to that content.
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Gendered and cultural moral rationalities: Pacific mothers’ pursuit of child support money

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To date, much of the analysis of child support has drawn on normative Western understandings of family structures, and the organisation and enactment of gender relations within that structure. There has been an absence of an examination of the way that ethnicity interacts with
gender to shape the decisions that mothers make about whether or not to pursue child support entitlements. The high rates of sole parenthood in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Pacific community, in conjunction with culturally distinctive modes of doing familial life, make research into how Pacific parents interpret, negotiate, and experience Aotearoa/New Zealand’s child support scheme timely.

Drawing on interviews with nine Pacific mothers eligible to receive child support, of whom three had formal child support arrangements (administered through Inland Revenue), four had informal child support agreements, and two mothers reported not receiving any child support, this paper shows that the decisions these mothers make about the pursuit of child support entitlements involves a complex negotiation and reconciliation of Pacific cultural values with mainstream gender ideals and practices commonly associated with ‘good’ mothering.

The findings from this research echo those of other studies (Natalier, 2012; Natalier & Hewitt, 2010, 2014) that have found that normative gendered ideas regarding the organisation and distribution of power and money in the private realm of family life shape how child support is interpreted and understood. However, given the different cultural expectations attached to family obligations and the means through which such obligations are met, the Pacific mothers’ narratives unsurprisingly signal some important points of difference.

The meanings that the Pacific mothers attached to child support money were multiple, contested, and unstable. Although defined as entitlement money through child support policy, the narratives of the Pacific mothers in this study point to the complex and subtle ways that their gendered parenting and ethnic social position operated to constrain entitlement behaviour. Their preferred treatment of child support money as a family obligation showed that they negotiated their role as separated mothers in relation to normative gender and cultural rationalities. All of the mothers in this study spoke of child support as money fathers were obliged to pay in order to fulfil their paternal role. The treatment of child support money as a family or paternal obligation, rather than an enforceable entitlement, operated as a means through which mothers could continue to act morally in relation to their children; by treating child support as a paternal obligation, mothers kept intact the rituals associated with, and the meanings attached to, fathers’ financial contributions to their children, thereby facilitating a positive relationship between the father and child.

Further, normative constructions of family obligations within Pacific cultures means that Pacific mothers who separate from the fathers of their children should be able to rely on their own kin to provide them with financial support if that is necessary. However, it is anticipated that the parent with care may informally pursue their former partner for support, either practical or financial. However, since families gain and maintain a sense of pride and solidarity through fulfilling family obligations, in situations where the father and his family do not voluntarily contribute towards the care of the child or if the child is not socially acknowledged, the mother and her family may not want to pursue any form of support from the father and/or his family in an effort to maintain a sense of family pride. Thus, mothers who pursue formal child support may run the risk of being shamed and criticised for acting in ways perceived as ‘too Western’ by turning to the state to enforce a parental and familial connection that is not voluntarily upheld. Inadvertently, pursuing formal child support also creates the possibility that a mother’s family might be perceived as failing to adequately provide for her and her children or, worse, that her family is not pulling together to support her. A mother’s decisions to pursue child support can be further constrained by the close relational nexus within which they live, making it difficult to enact entitlement behaviours without their family knowing, especially in situations where the mothers’ former partners are themselves Pacific and are known to the mother’s family.

However, the existence of mothers in this study with formal child support arrangement
indicates that one’s ethnic social and gendered parenting position does not act as an absolute barrier to pursuing child support formally. Notably, though, all three of these mothers had sought an informal arrangement first and remained open to such an arrangement in the future. The advantage of negotiating an informal child support arrangement is that it appeases fathers, enabling these men to see themselves and be seen by others as good fathers who continue to fulfil the obligation to provide for their children. In keeping fathers on side, Pacific mothers also constitute themselves as good post-separation mothers. Informal child support has another advantage too: it does not contradict the emphasis within Pacific cultures of practices of financial support that transcend household and even national boundaries. By acting in congruence with Pacific cultural norms, mothers with informal child support thereby affirm Pacific culture and identity.

The findings from this exploratory project underscore the importance of incorporating ethnicity and culture in research on child support and contribute, albeit in a preliminary manner, to an important gap in the child support literature.

References


Sexual violence in ethnic minority communities: A study of the barriers to data collection

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While increasing anecdotal evidence shows a rise in the levels of sexual violence and assaults in Aotearoa/New Zealand, little is known about the profile and nature of sexual violence within ethnic minority groups. An evidence base needs to be established to identify who is the main perpetrator, where the sexual violation is most likely to occur, and, most importantly, who the most vulnerable victims are likely to be. The breadth and reliability of data on sexual violence in ethnic communities is, unfortunately, weak. To highlight the issue of sexual violence within ethnic communities and therefore implement methods of change, there needs to be an evaluation of how sexual violence data are reported, recorded, and stored within non-government organisations (NGOs). This presentation outlines the findings of a small-scale qualitative research study that sought to understand the lack of an evidence base in sexual violence.

The scarcity of systematic data has a direct effect on the resource allocation and funding of services by NGOs working in the area of sexual and domestic violence. This, in turn, has an impact on the delivery of services based at a community level, which is where sexual violence prevention services are deemed to be the most effective. Strengthening the methods of collecting of systematic data can justify a need for policy change.

The present study was undertaken in two Aotearoa/New Zealand cities, Hamilton and Auckland, where three managers and social workers from various sexual and domestic violence prevention
organisations within the North Island were interviewed, with the support of the community-based network Campaign for Consent. The research was guided by an ‘ethnic’ feminist methodology that had an explicit interest in highlighting the voices, reasoning, and needs of ethnic women. The study built on the theoretical tensions between cultural relativism and feminism in the context of ethnic minority women. Cultural relativism acknowledges and validates a diversity of practices around women and their status in cultural communities and includes practices that may not centre women’s rights or justice. Feminism, on the other hand – considered as a Western construct – is solely focused on the rights of women regardless of the challenges that it might pose to their cultural beliefs and practises. Such tension rises when defining the term sexual violence or categorising what constitutes a sexual violation, thus impacting the reporting and recoding of sexual violence data within Aotearoa/New Zealand. A thematic analysis of the interviews in the present study brought to light two main findings: the barriers to reporting sexual violence and the constraints in recording sexual violence constraints.

The dominant definition of sexual violence used within New Zealand society is ambiguous and not reflective of the needs of ethnic communities, which, in turn, impacts reporting behaviour. The interviews revealed that cultural beliefs and practises of ethnic women led to different perspectives on the idea of consent, so most of the time when an ethnic woman accessed the NGO’s services, they disagreed with the social worker or manager that they were a victim of sexual violence because in their culture it is normalised for a husband or man to demand sex. This created an issue with reporting behaviour, as women would only report an assault if they had a grasp of the idea of consent and what it looked like from a western concept. Another reporting barrier women faced was cultural and related to the stigma they were likely to face when associated with being sexually violated. Ethnic women tended to blame themselves for the assault and preferred to resolve the issue within the family to avoid shaming their families and dishonouring their communities. Related to this idea, when ethnic women have to report their incident to someone who is of the same ethnicity as them it disincentivises reporting because women fear that the community worker knows them and their families, therefore reinforcing the fear of shame and stigmatisation.

The second main theme related to issues in recording sexual violence. At present, there is no guideline as to how to collect sexual violence data in Aotearoa/New Zealand. For example, organisations themselves have to set their own standard or criteria on what to record down or not when an incident is reported; it is not compulsory and therefore some organisations do not record anything. This is a serious issue because, when attempting to construct a profile of sexual violence for ethnic women, the data available are inconsistent and cannot be collated together. Given that there were no officially fixed categories of sexual violence data, sexual violence cases are likely to be classified as ‘needs assistance.’ Although arguably significantly different from cases of domestic and family violence, sexual violence tends to be grouped in this category.

Another factor linking to the issues of sexual violence data recording is the lack of funding. Funding ensures the NGOs access to resources that can help ethnic women utilise the services, such as language translators and ethnic counsellors. It was made apparent that ethnic women prefer to talk to someone from their cultural background to ensure a common ground of understanding; however, a lack of available ethnic workers meant women found it hard to disclose their assault, thereby influencing the level of sexual violence data available with which to construct a profile. The lack of resources also puts a strain on current workers, as they are not able to provide the quality of service their clients need. The amount of funding an NGO was allocated impacted on how sexual violations were recorded, as not all agencies were able to afford appropriate technology. Consequently, these gaps often lead to data being lost and
inconsistently recorded, creating barriers to the construction of a summation of a profile.

In conclusion, based on the findings, it is recommended that policy guidelines should urgently be developed in consultation with ethnic communities to support community-level NGOs with more systematic practices for recording sexual violence data. Enhanced engagement and coordination between community-based NGOs and policy makers is needed to establish coherent data collection procedures reflective of the needs and voices of ethnic women. By means of a standard measure, evidence can be collated together to form a profile of sexual violence for ethnic women, thereby impacting how and where resources are allocated to reduce sexual violence within ethnic communities in New Zealand.

The legacy of the Society for Research on Women (SROW)

MARY MOWBRAY and JUDY WHITCOMBE
Life members of SROW

In the 1960s and 1970s, women realised that much of the feminist struggle in Aotearoa/New Zealand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had become invisible and took action to counter that. Some of the efforts of those women, the ‘second wave of feminism’, are at risk of being forgotten nowadays. To that end, we describe the work of the Society for Research on Women (SROW), which was founded in 1966 and ‘wound up’ in 2006; the 50th anniversary of its founding was celebrated in May this year.

Beginning with an initial lecture series and the incorporation of the society, the Herstory continues with nationwide expansion and the establishment of seven branches. Building on the awakening feminist consciousness of women throughout New Zealand, the organisation planned research that would point to needed action. Members of the society individually contributed to the many tasks research entails. Consultants from areas covered by the research topics gave advice so the work would reach professional standards.

A survey in the four main urban centres covering a wide range of topics was followed by studies on specific topics in greater detail in local areas. If the need for research in a particular area was identified by members, they started a study group. The group discussed and prepared a proposal that was scrutinised and approved. Apart from specific expenses such as some report writing or printing costs, all work was on a voluntary basis. Across 40 years, over 70 research projects were undertaken and published. Publications were accepted as professional, celebrated, and promoted widely.

SROW was ‘wound up’ after 40 years for several reasons. These included the rise of research on women’s issues in the universities and the increased number of women moving into paid work, making voluntary research less feasible.

A publications list with links to the National Library can be found at this web address: https://sites.google.com/site/womensresearch50/home/publications, illustrated by the covers of publications (https://sites.google.com/site/womensresearch50/publication-cover-photos)

The full paper as presented at the conference is also on the website: https://sites.google.com/site/womensresearch50/society-for-research-on-women-in-nz/legacy
Sexual violence in ethnic minority communities: Discourses of violence and vulnerability

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Despite the rapidly growing proportion of ethnic and migrant populations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, there is little understanding of the nature of sexual violence within these communities. In the last decade, there has been developing work on domestic and family violence among ethnic women in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In contrast, relatively little is known about the sexual violence experienced by ethnic women. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the stigma and shame associated with sexual violence may impact on the likelihood of speaking out for some minority groups. Similar to domestic violence, perceptions and responses to sexual violence are deeply value laden and caught in the intersections of cultural norms and the experiences of being a migrant and an ethnic minority in society. To understand the potential under-reporting of sexual violence within these communities, it is therefore necessary to interrogate the values and norms around gender, sexuality, and violence within these communities.

The present study examines the constructions and perceptions of sexual violence prevalent within ethnic communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand to explore how culture and migration intersect in ways that make girls and women vulnerable to sexual violence. What are the discourses around the vulnerabilities faced by these women? And what is the influence of the potentially interrelating discourses around culture, poverty, migration, and discrimination? The research employed a small-scale qualitative study design. Six interviews were undertaken with women leaders drawn from a range of communities, including Middle Eastern, South Asian, African, and Chinese backgrounds. These women were chosen because of their valued knowledge and experience working with different communities in relation to sexual violence, and included academics, social workers, NGO managers, and response frontline workers.

Underpinning the basis of this research is a feminist methodology that aims to represent the voices of women and present findings from their perspective. A thematic and interpretive analysis uncovered a number of key themes, under the two broader themes of framing ethnic women and framing sexual violence. These findings tend to support current research on the silencing of this issue. Perceptions of ethnic minority women highlight that traditional cultural and, often, patriarchal values contribute to the framing of women, mostly linked to the emphasis placed on maintaining community and family honour. Quite often, these are shaped by a dominant male gaze as well as a dominant White gaze. These constructs then influence the framing of gender performativity for women in relation to the construction of their sexuality. This is through the focus on purity as well as associated role expectations, particularly in relation to marriage roles. The value placed on purity also means that sex outside the marriage context is frowned upon, therefore having negative implications for women who behave outside of these expectations. The framing of women, particularly within the marriage context, may also be influenced by pressures from factors such as pornography, where women are seen or expected to always be sexually available.

Constructions of sexual violence highlight that discriminatory practices and the internalisation of cultural norms contribute to the ‘double silencing’ of the issue for these communities. Sexual violence in these communities is silenced externally, through the lack of prioritisation of the issue, research, and subsequent action. It is also silenced internally, within communities because of the fear of community gossip, the internalisation of the stigma and shame associated with sexuality and sexual violence, and the emphasis placed on
upholding community and family honour. The challenges of migration also influence these constructions of sexual violence and can also be seen in relation to the barriers to speaking out, as well as defensiveness towards maintaining culture and how this manifests across different generations. The impact of the White gaze is also illustrated through migrant defensiveness against mainstream culture. This can be seen through the emphasis placed on maintaining cultural practices or identity. This defensiveness may also be seen in the younger generation of migrants against the older generation. The younger generation may be caught between maintaining cultural traditions and wanting to fit in with mainstream.

The internalisation of the stigma and shame associated with sexual violence, and the potential re-victimisation resulting from seeking help, act as barriers for women within ethnic minority communities to speak out. This could be contributing to the potential under-reporting of this issue for these communities as well as the challenges of developing an accurate sexual violence profile. Therefore, a framework for policy response is highlighted, and suggested key areas for future action include focusing on removing re-victimisation, facilitating help-seeking and praxis, which involves putting the research into practice. This includes implementing change on a structural level by involving communities themselves and providing women with resources to enable them to make their own choices.

‘It’s not very queer friendly’: Bisexual women’s experiences of using Tinder in Aotearoa/New Zealand

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Dating applications are currently one of the most popular means of finding intimate partners. Born out of online dating sites, dating applications are faster, easier to use, and focused on meeting people within a close geographical proximity. Tinder is currently one of the most popular dating applications globally, and is advertised as a female-friendly way for (primarily heterosexual) people to meet for friendship, dates, relationships, or casual sex. While Tinder is marketed towards a heterosexual audience, members of the queer community also use the application (app). The internet and online dating/dating apps are highly valued by LGB individuals because of the safety it affords them to seek out others from their community, in comparison with the discrimination they can face in the offline world (Lever, Grov, Royce, & Gillespie, 2008). Bisexual women have received limited academic attention, particularly in the area of romantic and sexual intimacies. Tinder, too, has not yet received a great deal of examination outside of mainstream media, despite its prominence in current popular culture.

An exploratory qualitative study examined the experiences of bisexual women who use Tinder in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Five women aged between 18 and 25 years were interviewed on their experiences and thoughts regarding Tinder, their dating lives, and their sexuality. This study was underpinned by feminist and critical understanding of gender and sexuality. Three preliminary themes were identified from the data: Tinder as not (queer) woman friendly, The (un)safety of Tinder, and Virtual (un)reality.

‘Not (queer) woman friendly’ examined participants’ feelings of being outsiders on Tinder and in the dating app environment in general, as they believed no place fits perfectly with them and their needs as queer women. Tinder is understood to be heteronormative and mirror offline reality for queer women where heterosexual people are understood as the default and those that do not identify as such are an afterthought. This led to frustration for the participants as they had
to overcome a lot of obstacles on Tinder to meet other queer women. Such obstacles included binary gender options of male and female, the large number of mixed-gender couples in the queer women section, and the visibility of straight users. In addition, participants experienced biphobia from other users who would act with hostility or send unwanted sexual messages. As a result, some participants would not mention their sexuality in their bio or directly to users in messages, further perpetuating the erasure of bisexuality through making bisexual people feel the need to hide their sexual orientation to avoid harassment.

The second theme, ‘(Un)safety of Tinder’ involved discussions pertaining to the safety of Tinder and potentially dangerous users of the app. This manifested in two ways: through perceptions of danger and precautions taken to avoid danger, and actual lived experiences of danger/risk. The media has often perpetuated narratives of danger in online environments and this led to participants being highly conscious of people misrepresenting themselves on Tinder. To avoid danger, several strategies were put in place by participants, such as only meeting with mutual friends, having a safety checklist before meeting anyone in person, and having an escape plan in case of danger. This narrative highlighted how women are positioned as needing to take responsibility for not putting themselves in danger, rather than a focus on the perpetrators. Such victim-blaming mentality can then lead to people blaming themselves for not taking enough elaborate precautions, as we saw when participants recounted their experiences of sexual coercion with Tinder dates. Several of the participants were coerced into sex by men from Tinder they were dating, for which they positioned themselves at fault. This level of coercion is reflective of the statistics on how bisexual-identified women are at a greater likelihood to be sexually assaulted than people of any other sexuality (Walters, Chen, & Breiding, 2013). This theme shows that being concerned for your safety has been normalised, particularly when using dating apps.

The final theme, ‘Virtual (un)reality’, discusses the way people position offline and online dating in relation to each other. This was first looked at through participants constructing Tinder as less ‘messy’ than dating offline. Offline was constructed as a complicated and difficult place to meet dates and sexual partners as it was seen as fraught with obstacles. This was particularly true for people who viewed themselves to be low in confidence or introverted, as they found offline dating daunting. However, they did not position meeting people from Tinder in person this way, only when the dating is done primarily offline. Tinder, on the other hand, was viewed as providing some relief from the offline world due to the design of the app.

In the second section of this theme, online and mobile dating were positioned as ‘not as realistic’ as offline dating. Participants drew on words like ‘connection’ to explain this, as a ‘connection’ was something that they could not decipher through an online medium. They stressed the importance of meeting in person as participants could then decide whether they had ‘chemistry’ with their date beyond getting along. This was attributed to the disparity in identity between offline and online as participants understood Tinder users as not displaying their whole self online, which they presumed to be a self-protection mechanism.

Finally, we concluded that prominent gender and dating norms that were made visible through the participants’ experiences of Tinder were not created by the app but are further perpetuated by its design and users. Tinder is merely another site where already existing unequal patriarchal and heteronormative power relations play out, and women using the app continue to navigate the challenges intrinsic to simply being a woman in our society. Such navigation parallels our negotiation of offline obstacles, so while people say that dating online is not as real as offline, it still reflects our material reality.
Who is marginalised? Conflicting accounts of disadvantage in policy engagement

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Amidst the widening social, economic, and cultural disparities in Aotearoa/New Zealand, successive governments have taken steps to improve the political inclusion of socially marginalised groups, including, among others, Māori, ethnic and/or migrant and refugee groups, women, and disabled groups. Political inclusion, or the conscious effort to represent the voices of the socially disadvantaged, can be effected through formal measures such as institutional representation or through informal measures; namely, contribution to policy processes through participation in public consultations or through creating grassroots/community democratic engagement. Political inclusion aligns with Nancy Fraser’s notion of social justice as ‘representation’ and is arguably the foundation upon which redistributive and recognition justice rests (Fraser, 2009).

The involvement of citizens in policy and political process is not new in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Variedly referred to as ‘public engagement’, ‘direct citizen participation’, ‘user participation’, or even ‘deliberative democracy’, citizen inclusion, ironically, grew out of new public management (NPM) in the 1980s and 1990s, signalling the workings of conservative market-oriented and neoliberal strategies. The aim was to improve policy, which, like any consumer product, needed to be tailored for its consumers/clients/citizens. Engagement serves a range of purposes – from making better policy through informed discussion and fulfilling legal mandates for, at its best, ‘co-producing the process and content of decision-making, engaging multiple ways of knowing, and sustaining temporal openness’ (Quick & Feldman, 2011, p. 272).

Government engagement with marginal and excluded groups is more than an extension of ongoing practices that encourage citizen participation. Faced with the particularities of identity and difference, and the politics of minority group diversity, engagement with marginalised groups is both an innovation and a challenge requiring, at the least, reconstitution and contestation of policy at the level of discourse, structures, and relationships.

However, a central conundrum in the process of engaging marginal groups faced by policy makers is – who is marginal? In a complex world of intersectional identities and disadvantages, who can make a claim to be marginal and to experience marginality? This paper, informed by theoretical scholarship and the results of an empirical study conducted in Aotearoa/New Zealand, develops a critique outlining the complexity of defining marginal groups for policy and political inclusion.

Theoretically, marginality may be understood in one of three ways. First, it can be understood as social categories or ‘historically disadvantaged groups.’ In this form,
Marginality tends to be defined through phenotypical markers or ‘unchosen characteristics of persons’ (Gutmann, 2009, p. 9), such as sex, race, ability, age, and sexuality, noting that what might be rooted in biological differences are essentially a reflection of social constructions of inferiority and disadvantage. This approach creates a notion of essentialist group, with clear inside/outside categories, made up of predetermined social categorisations with a fairly stable set of disadvantages they are likely to experience. Second, it can also be interpreted as structural categories where marginality is defined by current social arrangements and through the experience of structural marginalisation. Marginalised groups are those who experience ‘systemic constraints’ and who are unable to thrive given these constraints (Young, 2000). A typical example would be the grouping ‘ethnic’ or ‘Asian’ or ‘migrant’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand. These groups have come into being in the last two decades, not as prefixed categories, despite broad biological similarities, but rather given structural similarities with others in their situation. Structural identity has advantages – it suggests internal coherence based on shared experience – but can also have potential downsides; not all members of an identity share the same politics, which raises the possibility of internalised conflicts within marginal groups. Third, marginality can also be defined as constitutive categories. Emerging out of the work of post-structural theorists (see Mouffe, 1992; Weedon, 1987), marginal identities are considered as constituted temporally and spatially by power and discourse rather than pre-fixed by socio-biology or social structure. From a post-structuralist perspective, individuals and groups do not experience inequality or disadvantage because structures are able to regulate their entitlements. Arguably, structures are variable and volatile, and identities are not stable. What was marginal yesterday might shift to another social positioning at another time. These various depictions of the marginal are closely tied to the changing discourses of society, which in turn are linked to socio-political transitions. Because categories come into and out of ‘being’ repeatedly, it is important to understand not only the categories but also the underlying societal discursive structures that constitute and reconstitute them. Queer and transgender identities, for instance, have been identified variously in the last 20–30 years as invisible, deviant, disempowered, or as a visible and politically viable emergent collective.

In an empirical study of policy engagement among migrants between 2009 and 2013 in Aotearoa/New Zealand, these diverse understandings of marginality were found to be used variously and sometimes in contradiction among various actors in a policy community. High-level policy makers involved in conceptualising strategic policy were more likely to categorise groups as structurally marginal. Consequently, their policy focus was on the differences in needs amongst even phenotypically similar groups; thus, first-generation Chinese were seen to have needs that differed from those of second-generation Chinese. On the other hand, mid-level bureaucrats involved in everyday resource allocation, for instance, in the housing or health sector, tended to define marginality according to social identity categorisations, so that needs were based on the qualifications of belonging to the ‘Congolese’ or the ‘Indian’ or ‘Middle-Eastern’ community. In these cases, these actors drew on essentialist ideas of communities and group needs to determine who was marginal. A third category, the marginal community itself steered away from socially and policy-defined notions of marginality, seeking to replace these with new constitutive discursive categories, especially if the former highlighted a needs or deficit status. The links between criteria for marginality, identity, and needs were continually obfuscated.

Overall, the research highlighted an interesting link between marginality and difference. For those in policy-making positions, marginality was tied to identities that differentiated, to political effect, the marginal from the mainstream. The community, on the other hand, found political value in diminishing marginality based on historical or structural differences,
instead highlighting difference through strengths-focused definitions. Often, these entailed the constitution of new discourses of identity.

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Analysing responses to the art exhibition A different view

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It is estimated that, every second, 28,258 Internet users worldwide are viewing pornography. While consideration of whether and how pornography exploits, subordinates, and objectifies women is the basis for much debate in moral philosophy and feminist theory, it is mostly tolerated in Aotearoa/New Zealand society. In August 2013, a feminist exhibition opened at Gus Fisher Gallery at the University of Auckland in Aotearoa/New Zealand entitled A different view: Artists address pornography. Funded by the Royal Society of New Zealand’s Marsden Fund, this art exhibition was one component of a much larger programme of action research examining the effects of pornography on society. Its premise was that since the advent of the internet, digital culture had become saturated with hardcore, sexually explicit images, and an art exhibition could be an intervention into visual culture where some of the tropes of porn could be called into question.

In comparison with the interpretation of art, which can be complex, pornography’s job appears to be simple. It is explicit and represents people as objects, whereas art is merely suggestive, inviting us into the subjectivity of the artist’s perspective. Pornography focusses on sexual parts rather than people and often represents sexual acts as alienated, emotionless, and aggressive. Since sexually explicit imagery can be found in art from Japanese Ukiyo-e prints to ancient Roman sculptures of pagan licentiousness, art can also be pornographic. Instead of trying to distinguish art and pornography as separate categories, could an exhibition explore the common ground they share? Questions such as these guided the process to realise an art exhibition to research the effects of pornography on Aotearoa/New Zealand society.

However, in general, art reviewers and art audiences evaluated the exhibition in terms of the quality of the art on display and were oblivious to the aims of the exhibition or to its relationship to the larger project. Viewing art in an art gallery is an aesthetic experience, where materials and execution shape the viewer’s response, whereas pornography is aimed at sexual arousal, yet many visited the exhibition expecting to find it pornographic. For example, Kelly Carmichael’s response ‘Pondering porn’ for Eyecontact (a website dedicated to reviews of contemporary art exhibitions, which receives funding from Creative New Zealand) includes comments such as, ‘it is surprising to find works that seem a little off the mark and don’t really have anything to do with addressing pornography in the show’ (Carmichael, 2013). She went on to identify Richard McWhannell’s
naked self-portraits as ‘hardly pornography’ as if the exhibition was aiming to project the art works within it coherently as simultaneously both art and pornography. The process followed for the exhibition was that 20 Aotearoa/New Zealand artists were invited to participate in focus groups and then commissioned to make or submit art works for inclusion as they felt appropriate. The curatorial concept for the exhibition was to elicit works of art that mimic or make reference to pornography, without themselves actually being pornography, therefore providing ‘a different view’ and ‘addressing pornography’ without being pornographic.

What Carmichael failed to remark on in her critique was that McWhannell chose to include paintings based on works by the Swiss artist Balthus. One is a re-imagining of Balthus’s *The guitar lesson* (1934), a representational image that is still considered too risqué to display in public. McWhannell substitutes his wife for the seated female and himself, naked, for the figure of the little girl stretched across her lap. The National Business Review’s John Daly-Peoples noticed the quotation, observing that ‘the two paintings by Richard McWhannell featuring gender reversal are both based on painting by Balthus, whose work had strong Freudian elements.’ (Daly-Peoples, 2013). Yet, the enigmatic Balthus on which the composition is modelled, and McWhannell’s painting, both require the viewer to question whether the sexualisation is in the artist’s mind or their own. Several of the other works in the exhibition were selected because of the ways in which they might implicate or incriminate the viewer in similar ways.

Rather than keeping the focus on pornography in society, the exhibition was variously described more generally as being about sex or the body. John Daly-Peoples commented that Kushana Bush’s ‘delicate gouaches of figures engaged in sexual activity derive from the Kama Sutra which links sexual education, sexual pleasure and spiritual connections’ (Daly-Peoples, 2013). Carmichael (2013) felt that ‘Kushana Bush’s ethereal gouaches from 2011 surely fall into the category of erotic rather than lewd’, suggesting that there was a clear division between the erotic and the pornographic. Her writing reached back to the etymology of the terms themselves: erotic deriving from eros, the Greek word for love or passion as distinct from the lewd, which represents pornography, from the Latin porne, meaning prostitute, where sexuality is dehumanised and based on exploitation of women. The aim of the exhibition was not to categorise the art, but rather to use an art exhibition to encourage discussion of just such issues as the imaging of sexuality; yet, egregiously, reviewers chose to evaluate the exhibition as a static exhibition rather than in conjunction with its corollary public programme.

Judy Darragh, one of the artists included in the exhibition *A different view*, drew the comparison to the 1994 Artspace exhibition *One hundred and fifty ways of loving*, which had been a multimedia group show in which over 200 artists participated, exploring definitions of erotica, censorship, sexual diversity, and transgressive imagery. That exhibition was curated by photographer Ann Shelton in response to the new Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, which was perceived by her and the other organisers to be a law that was ushering in an era of greater censorship. Artspace’s website carries the precis,

In the mid-1990s censorship was a hot issue. In America, the culture wars were underway and were known here through much-publicised attempts to close down Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe shows. In New Zealand stronger censorship legislation is coming into force … the exhibition has to be classified: R18. (Artspace, 2017)

However, crucially, *One hundred and fifty ways of loving* was produced before the age of the internet with its pervasive distribution of pornography, which has made previously age-restricted material available to everyone.

While critics and even the artists who participated in the exhibition seem to have various
versions of the take-home message, what did become apparent during the exhibition’s season was that art no longer has the power to shock. One mainstream newspaper coined the neologism ‘yawnography’ to describe the works on display as part of A different view. As unfashionable as it might be to use an art exhibition to open up space to discuss social issues, A different view succeeded on its own terms. It brought new audiences into the gallery to discuss their concerns and their responses and was an invaluable contribution to research culture – a refreshing deployment of art to focus ideas on a contentious issue.

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